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

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

PROBLEMS OF PEACE

BY

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, Ph.D., F.R.S.

Author of "The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire," "The New Map of Europe," "The New Map of Africa," etc.

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TO

MY MOTHER

INDEFATIGABLE TRAVELER
WHO LOVES THE LANDS AND RACES
OF
THE NEAR EAST

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FOREWORD

The chapters of this book were written as a series of articles for the "Century Magazine." At the time of the Russian Revolution and the intervention of the United States, the chapters on Poland and Constantinople had already been published and the others were in print.

The Russian Revolution has not changed the general aspect of the problems of reconstruction in the Near East. The principle of independent Poland still needs to be insisted upon, and the plea for the Balkan nationalities and the races of the Near East still needs to be advanced. The contest in Petrograd over changing Russia's objects in the war nearly led to the disruption of the Provisional Govern-

ment. The resistance of the Cadets and Octobrists to the new policy of "no annexations, no indemnities," culminating in M. Miliukoff's effort to rob the Revolution of its significance in so far as Russian foreign policy was concerned, shows that Russian imperialism was not destroyed in March. The reactionaries will not fail to try to overthrow the new régime. They will look to imperialistic aspirations again, as in the past, to win outside support: and they know from the past that not a single European power has ever hesitated to sell out liberalism and democracy in Russia to secure the diplomatic support of the occult powers. Only when secret diplomacy is abandoned in Europe will democracy be safe in Russia, and only then will the Poles and the Near Eastern races be free to work out their own destinies.

The problems of the reconstruction of

Poland and the Near East are of more vital interest to Americans than when I wrote these articles. The intervention of the United States on the side of the Entente realizes a hope and longing I have had from the beginning of the world conflict. But whether the great war goes down to history as the struggle of idealism and democracy against materialism and autocracy or as an economic and political conflict of rival states fighting for European and extra-European territorial expansion, depends very largely upon how we play our rôle. We must not be drawn by the heat of the struggle into the espousal of terms of peace contrary to the principles and ideals of American foreign and internal policy.

We have gone into the war with all our might and all our will, and we shall spare no sacrifice of blood and treasure to de-

feat Germany's schemes of territorial aggrandizement and subjugation of other nations. But we must be on our guard, with our Allies, to avoid the pitfall of being conquered by those whom we conquer. We go forth to destroy militarism. Let us not set up another militarism. We go forth to punish imperialism. Let us not become imperialistic. We go forth to free nations from their slavery to our enemies. Let us not make them our slaves.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS.

Paris, June 1, 1917.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

THE FUTURE OF POLAND

The Poles no longer have a common country, but they have a common language. They will remain, then, united by the strongest and most durable of all bonds. They will arrive, under foreign domination, to the age of manhood, and the moment they reach that age will not be far from that in which, emancipated, they will all be attached once more to one center.—*Talleyrand, after his return from the Congress of Vienna, 1815.*

GREAT BRITAIN and France, as well as Russia, Austria, and Prussia, were signatories of the Treaty of Vienna, and were bound by their signature to enforce its provisions. The first article of the final act of the Congress of Vienna declared solemnly: "The Poles,

subjects respectively of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, will obtain national representation and national institutions." Russia, in addition, undertook to preserve separate and autonomous the kingdom of Poland, which was to enjoy its own laws, language, and constitution. During the hundred years that Europe lived under the régime established by the Congress of Vienna, Russia, Austria, and Prussia constantly and consistently regarded their international obligation toward the Poles as a "scrap of paper." British and French diplomats of successive ministries never lifted a finger to help the Poles to retain those rights guaranteed to them at Vienna. They were content to send notes of mild remonstrance to Russia after the disgraceful events of 1831 and 1863, and to Austria when the Republic of Cracow was suppressed in 1846. It is only since the be-

ginning of the present war that the surprising thesis has been developed in London and Paris that a nation is materialistic and has no sense of honor when it does not wish to rush into war over questions of principle and humanity which do not vitally affect its own national interests, and that it is a sign of weakness, pusillanimity, and indecision for statesmen to send notes!

There has been among enlightened liberals in all nations, and especially in France, deep sympathy for the martyrdom of Poland, and a desire to see her historic wrongs righted. But during the decade preceding the outbreak of the European War, the Poles learned that they had no friends anywhere among the nations. For when Germany and Russia entered into a new era of persecution, more formidable than any experienced in the past, there was no protest except from Austria-

Hungary, who had manifestly an ax to grind. More than that, old friends in Great Britain and France, with an eye to conciliating Russia, not only became indifferent in the hour of trial, but even attempted to justify—or at least to condone—the crimes of Russia. Long before the events of August, 1914, proved the reality of the "Triple Entente," the Anglo-Russo-French alliance was foreshadowed in the way London and Paris journalism handled the Polish question. If there is one lesson for Americans in the European War and the events which preceded it, it is that we must write our own history and do our own reporting. Otherwise we are sure to be misinformed about what has been done, and is being done, in Europe. Prejudice, hopeless bias, insincerity, special pleading, are the order of the day among European writers.

The violation of Russia's international obligations to Poland and Finland has been explained on the ground that the old Russian policy was dictated by the bureaucracy, and that all would be changed when the will of enlightened Russian liberalism began to make itself felt. The inauguration of the Duma was hailed as the beginning of a new era for Russia, just as the reëstablishment of Abdul-Hamid's constitution was hailed as the beginning of a new era for Turkey. There seemed to be a curious failure—and there still is—on the part of Occidental observers to realize that the attempt to graft our constitutionalism upon these two Oriental organisms could not bring forth the fruit confidently predicted and immediately expected. The democracy of western Europe is a slow growth, born of Rome, the Renaissance, and the Reforma-

tion, nurtured by the tears and blood of our ancestors through many generations, and made secure through universal education. What can we hope for in eastern Europe and Asia in less than a decade?

Poland and Finland fared far worse at the hands of Russia since the Duma came into being than before. The Russian liberals are nationalists of the most virulent type, and they believe that the full play of constitutionalism is possible only after the entire empire has undergone thorough Russification. So they have waged a bitter war against the Poles by reducing Polish representation in the Duma, by opposing local self-government for municipalities, by refusing the Poles the privilege of being educated in their own language, and by searching for the development of existing laws and the

invention of new laws to ruin the Poles economically. It is the fashion to-day to hold up Austria-Hungary under the Hapsburgs as the shining example of the oppressor of small nationalities that have been seeking to lead their own life. Certainly none can deny the oppression of the Slavic nationalities in the dual monarchy by the German and Magyar bureaucrats of Vienna and Budapest. I was in Agram, the capital of Croatia, during that memorable spring of 1912, when the iniquity of Austria-Hungarian officialdom was laid bare before the world. Only three months later I was in Helsingfors, the capital of Finland, and it was while I was investigating the Russian persecution of the Finns that I read an "inspired" news article from Petrograd which attempted to justify the separation of the province of Khelm from the king-

dom of Poland. Never, in the worst days of the iron heel, had the old Russian despotism gone so far as to impair the territorial integrity of the Poland intrusted to Russia by the Congress of Vienna!

Until we are sure that the hold of the Socialists upon the Russian Provisional Government is going to last until after the Peace Conference, we can put no faith in the proclamation promising independence to Poland. In spite of the success of Kerensky and his associates in ousting M. Miliukoff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Cabinet all together, we must remember that the Duma still exists, and that the Cadets and Octobrists have little inclination to support the program of the Socialists. When M. Miliukoff was in Paris in 1916, he disappointed and pained his old liberal friends by his bitter hostility to Polish autonomy, let

alone Polish independence. The Petrograd Revolution was the work of the Socialists and the extreme Radicals, whose principles—in every country in Europe—are irreconcilable with nationalism and imperialism. The bulk of the members of the Duma, and most of the Russian leaders who call themselves moderates, are more Czarist than Czarism itself in their views on foreign policy. If the extremists ruin their prestige by excesses and inability to cope with the situation, the moderates, returning to power, will give short shrift to Polish dreams of independence.

During the last decade, the Prussian Government, also without interference from the imperial Reichstag, carried on a brutal and cynical war against the Poles of Posnania and Eastern Prussia. The aim of German statesmen, like those of Russia, was to stamp out Polish nation-

ality by every possible means. Some Socialists and a certain section of the Catholic Center protested in the Reichstag and in the press against Prussia's anti-Polish measures, pointing out their folly as well as their illegality. But the great bulk of the German lawmakers [1] profess the same narrow nationalism as the Russian lawmakers. They are determined to give no quarter to Poles who have the misfortune to be German subjects until they abandon their nationality and their language. From 1848 up to the outbreak of the present war, Germany has displayed complete solidarity with Russia in her treatment of the Polish question. The dictum has been, "Poland is dead; she must never be resuscitated."

[1] Let us keep in mind that the Duma, hostile to Polish independence, is still the legal lawmaking body in Russia, until the project of a national election has been realized.


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MOSCOW
VILNA
BERLIN
POSEN
Oder R.
Vistula R.
Bug R.
WARSAW
Pripet R.
Dnieper R.
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VIENNA
BUDA-PESTH
Dniester R.
Pruth R.
ODESSA
Sea of Azov
Mouths of the Danube
Black Sea
POLAND AT THE MOMENT OF THE FIRST PARTITION-1772
POLISH PROVINCES LOST BEFORE THE FIRST PARTITION
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Of the partitioners, Austria alone gave the Poles autonomy, and allowed them freedom in the development of their national life and their national institutions. Galicia has enjoyed a peculiarly fortunate geographical and political position since the formation of the dual monarchy in 1867. To keep the Bohemians in check, to prevent the spread of Russian propaganda, to forestall the possibility of the German element being put in a minority in the Vienna Reichsrath by a Panslavic combination, Austrian statesmen have consistently curried favor with the Poles. Thanks to the exigencies of Austrian internal politics, Galicia has become the foyer of Polish nationalism, and from Cracow and Lemberg has gone forth the light to keep alive and foster the hope of the ultimate realization of the aspirations of the Polish people. Many Poles have

resented deeply what they call the Galicians' indifference to, or, as it is sometimes more strongly put, betrayal of the pan-Polish ideal. But is it not because they refuse to put themselves in the other man's place, and to realize that he who gets must give? It would be strange indeed if the Galicians, comparing their lot with that of Poles under the Romanoffs and Hohenzollerns, should remain uncompromising and unwilling—if only for policy's sake—to give a certain measure of loyalty and to show a certain measure of appreciation to the Hapsburgs.

But from an economic point of view, the Poles under the Hapsburgs have suffered serious handicaps for which political autonomy is only a partial recompense. If we believe in the principle that all subjects of a state have a right to free and unrestricted enjoyment of the advantages

accruing from membership in that state, and are not to be discriminated against or exploited for the profit of others, there is ground for a serious indictment of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in the treatment of the Poles, however favored they may have been politically. Nearly one third of Austria's grain, more than two fifths of her potatoes, one half of her horses, and one fourth of her cattle are raised in Galicia. Hungary and portions of Austria specialize in the same products; so the agriculture and stock-raising of Galicia are not essential for the well-being of the empire. And by refusing logical railway and canal construction, Austria and Hungary have kept Galicia in a position of inferiority for export of agricultural products and stock. There has been equal malevolence in the way Austria has blocked the development of Galicia's salt

to prevent industrial competition. Austria, enjoying free trade with Galicia, has forced her manufactured products upon the Poles, and they have been powerless to compel her to take from Galicia a full equivalent in Galician products. Only the discovery of petroleum, which is not found elsewhere in the dual monarchy, has enabled Galicia to prosper in the face of artificial economic disadvantages.

From the point of view of intention, and in execution, the Russian exploitation of Poland has been far worse. Since 1865, Polish proprietors in Ruthenia and Lithuania have been compelled to pay into the Russian treasury a supertax of ten per cent. on their income. The kingdom of Poland, with only one fifteenth of the population, has of recent years been mulcted for nearly one fourth of the entire revenue of the Russian Empire! Besides sup-

porting between two and three hundred thousand foreign functionaries, oppressors, and criminals, the Poles have furnished a large part of the funds for Russia's activities in Siberia and central Asia. For the money raised by taxes is not spent in the country. The Poles, powerless to legislate for themselves and control the expenditure of the tremendous taxes wrung from them, have had to struggle against the handicap of the most miserable roads in Europe. In this day of international commerce, when transportation facilities mean so much, Russian Poland, both in proportion to inhabitants and to area, has fewer railways than any other country in Europe. Taking wagon roads and railways together, Russian Poland holds the lowest place among the civilized countries of the world. Russian Poland is perhaps also the only country in the world where

public primary education has fallen off in the last four hundred years. The Russian exploiters, filling their treasury with Polish money, maintained, according to the census of 1912, only 4641 primary schools in Poland, with 282,000 pupils. This means one school for every 2750 inhabitants; while the rest of Russia enjoys a school for every 1430 inhabitants. In the same territory, in the year 1500, the Poles had a primary school for every 2250 inhabitants. The most sweeping suppression of public education in Poland has come since the establishment of the Duma. In 1906 nearly a thousand primary schools were closed in Poland without explanation or justification. In the kingdom of Poland, right down to the opening of the present war, the régime of bitter oppression continued. There was no liberty of speech, of association, of teaching, of

press, and even the private expression of one's opinion led to banishment or death.

Despite the ill will and incompetency of the bureaucracy, Russian Poland has prospered wonderfully from the industrial point of view, and has gained steadily in importance as a manufacturing country. Warsaw has attained over a million inhabitants, and the growth of Lódz is comparable to that of the great industrial cities of Germany, England, and America. In their industrial life the people of Poland have benefited by the union with Russia, for they have been able to develop their manufactures with the view of supplying the needs of the greatest country of Europe, a country in which industry is far behind that of other nations. It is not surprising that those who have benefited by the open door to Russian markets have been willing to submit to

political persecution and even to economic discrimination. What matters it if railway rates are so arranged that freight from Warsaw to Moscow pays a considerably higher tariff than freight from Moscow to Warsaw? As long as Russia cannot compete with Poland in manufactures, the industrial element in Poland is willing to grin and bear this discrimination. But it is not the same for agriculture, which is after all the chief source of wealth of every country. Russian Poland is marvelously rich, and its people are as industrious as any in the world. They get along. But how much better they could do if they had a fair chance! Under Russian rule, Poles have emigrated in great numbers, and hundreds of thousands who ought to have plenty to do at home must go every year to Germany to find work at living wages.

From the purely material point of view,

In this map, the territory in which those of Polish extraction predominate is indicated in black. That part of it to the right of the white line is at present included in Russia; of that to the left, the northern portion is now included in Germany, the southern, in Austria.

the Poles cannot claim to be badly off under German rule. They have benefited fully as much as the Germans themselves by the prosperity of the German Empire since its unification. Roads are good and well kept up. Railroads are abundant. The economic organization is superb. One has only to study the figures of Polish bank balances in Prussia to see that the Poles have received their full share of the prosperity that has come to Germany during the last thirty years. In spite of hostile legislation, they have enjoyed as individuals the protection and privileges of the German laws. There are schools for all in Prussian Poland. Polish working-men share in the benefits of enlightened German social legislation. The press is free. For this reason Posen, and not Warsaw, has become the center for books, magazines, and newspapers in the

Polish language. German Poles have everything but the right to be Poles and govern themselves. The attitude of the Prussian Junker to the Pole is very similar to that of the English Tory to the Irishman: "You have the full dinner-pail. Your union with us is of enormous benefit to you. Why, in the name of Heaven, are you not satisfied?"

Up to the outbreak of the war in 1914, Russia, Germany, and to a certain extent Austria, ignored the possibility of the resurrection of the Polish nation. They had declared so repeatedly that the independence of Poland was a chimera, and that "agitators" who kept alive the feeling of nationality among their Poles were criminals and working against the best interests of their people, that the rest of Europe—the whole world in fact—had ended by believing that the Polish ques-

tion was dead. No more striking illustration of this can be found than in the simple fact that three years ago a writer could not get published in a big newspaper, much less in a leading magazine or review, any article dealing with the possibility of the resurrection of Poland. I know, for I have tried. The invariable answer was that there was no interest in the Polish question, or that the Polish question did not exist.

But when the participants of Poland came to blows among themselves, the world awoke suddenly to the fact that the Polish question was not dead, that the Poles had kept alive through a century of martyrdom their consciousness of race, and that they were numerous enough to have a decisive effect upon the issue of the war. How bitterly the Germans must have rued the Prussian policy of antag-

onizing the Poles! What an advantage the Central Powers would have enjoyed had the Prussian Landtag during the last decade shown toward the Poles the same liberal spirit as the Austrian Reichsrath! If Germany and Austria-Hungary had been able to get together at the very beginning of the war, and had announced to *all* the Poles that they intended to restore Poland as an independent nation, Russia would have been powerless to strike a blow on the eastern front. But chickens came home to roost for Germany immediately. In view of the bitter Prussian persecution during the last decade, how could the Poles be expected to have more faith in German promises than in the words of the Grand Duke Nicholas? The Poles did not know where they stood, and had little reason to put any faith at all in the fair promises of either side.

The first months of the war were a period of enthusiasm, when clear detached thinking was virtually impossible for any one. No man with red blood in his veins could be really neutral. One simply had to take sides, and the fact that Russia was the ally of France and that the offensive movement of the Russian armies relieved the pressure upon Paris was sufficient for men of liberal thought throughout the whole world to do their very best to accept and believe the Russian promises made to Poland in the Grand Duke Nicholas's proclamation. Even in August, 1914, however, it was very difficult to take at face-value this stirring appeal for Polish friendship. The Russian change of heart lay under the natural suspicion of being due to expediency and determined by the military exigencies of the moment. This suspicion grew when

the Grand Duke's promises were not confirmed by an imperial ukase. Then came the temporary Russian successes in Galicia and the capture of Lemberg. Russia had her moment of great opportunity. But instead of conserving Polish liberties enjoyed under Austrian rule in this historic Polish city, Russian officials, military and civil, started right in on the old policy of sweeping Russification, and let the Poles understand clearly that there was no hope of emancipation from Russia. It is not too much to say that had Russia been successful in her initial campaign and kept the Germans out of Poland, we should have heard no more of the promises of August, 1914.

Hard a blow as it was, then, to the cause of the Allies, the entry of the Germans into Warsaw was a distinct step forward for the realization of Polish aspirations;

while the failure of the Russians to capture Cracow and their debacle in eastern Galicia could not be looked upon by the Poles in any other light than as rescue from a great danger.

I do not mean to infer by this that the success of the Central Powers, if permanent, would have resulted in the restoration of Poland to independence or autonomy. The decisive success of either group of belligerents, in a short war, would have meant for the Poles merely the passing from Scylla to Charybdis. Victorious Germany would not have needed to conciliate the Poles any more than victorious Russia. In fact, had the war lasted only one or two years, the question of Poland and her aspirations would easily and quickly have been forgotten in the peace conference. Had Germany been victorious, no voice would have been raised to

compel her to settle the destinies of central and eastern Europe in any other way than in accordance with her own selfish desires. Certainly a protest in behalf of Poland would never have come from the German people. Is not the impotence of liberal sentiment of the imperial Reichstag to prevent the execution of Prussian iniquitous measures in Posnania during the last decade sufficient proof of this? On the other hand, had Russia been immediately and overwhelmingly successful, could liberal public sentiment in France and England have forced the czar's government to do the square thing by the Poles? We cannot forget the remarkable words of Lord Castlereagh to the House of Commons after his return from the Congress of Vienna in 1815. His comment upon the failure to resuscitate Poland was simply this:

There was undoubtedly a strong feeling in England upon the subject of independence and a separate government of Poland: indeed, there was, I believe, but one feeling, and, as far as I was able, I exerted myself to obtain that object.

Nothing was ever done for Poland, even at the time of the events of 1831, 1846, and 1863, by the British Government and the British people.

We have come to the end of the third year of the war, and the destinies of Europe are still in the balance. But Poland has already entered again upon the map of Europe. On November 5, 1916, the emperors of Germany and Austria-Hungary, by a proclamation at Warsaw, reconstituted the kingdom of Poland. It is true that this was a war measure, and that there can be no *de jure* Poland until the peace conference has passed upon the question. But the act of the Central

Powers, who are in possession, constitutes a *de facto* Poland that neither group of belligerents will be able to do away with. Poles are not satisfied with the Austro-German proclamation, which did not settle the frontiers of the new state, and which seemed by significant omission to indicate a determination of the Central Powers not to contribute themselves to the new kingdom. Germany has said nothing at all about Posnania, and Austria-Hungary's declaration of fuller autonomy for Galicia seems to signify that Galicia is not to be part of the independent Poland.

The Entente Powers lost a great opportunity through their inability to force Russia to forestall the Teutonic offer. Even after it was made, there was still opportunity for the Entente Powers to unite in a solemn guarantee to assure to Poland unity and independence. Since it

could have included unity, the offer would have been better than that of the Central Powers. But Russia remained stubborn, and the telegrams of the French and British premiers and the proclamation of the czar promising united Poland "autonomy under the scepter of the czars" were pitiful and impotent subterfuges. No Pole is to be longer fooled by Russian offers of "autonomy," and the only guarantee of the Entente Powers worth the paper it was written on would be the collective guarantee of independence. The Petrograd Conference "to discuss the future organization of Poland and her relations with the Russian Empire," announced for the end of February, 1917, was interrupted by the Revolution which overthrew the government of Czar Nicholas. One of the first acts of the Provisional Government was to proclaim the

principles of Polish independence, and the Polish members of the Duma resigned, claiming that there was no longer reason for them to sit in a Russian Parliament. The action of the Provisional Government remains to be ratified by the Russian nation. Poles will suspend judgment until the ratification is a fact. There is one disquieting phrase in the proclamation of the Provisional Government. After stating that "the Polish people will be freed and unified and will determine themselves their form of government," the proclamation goes on to say, "Attached to Russia by a free military union," etc. If the Poles are to determine their form of government, they must not be bound by any stipulations made beforehand by Russia. The term "independence" does not bear qualification.

The Central Powers, on the other hand,

have not won the Poles any more than the Entente Powers; for they have tried to raise an army among the Poles before settling the territorial and political status of the new Poland, and they are opposed on principle to the Polish ideal of united Poland.[1]

The Poles are undoubtedly placed in an extremely embarrassing and delicate situ-

[1] On February 4, 1917, the Germans and Austrians decided to recognize formally a provisional Government, composed of Poles, and independent of Generals Kuk and Beseler. The Council of State of Poland, created at the beginning of the year, now enjoys governing authority. This can be considered as a victory for the Poles in their determination not to allow the Germans and Austrians to hold forth a fictitious autonomy as bait for raising a "Polish army" under Austro-German control. From November 7 to February 3 the Poles were successful in frustrating the German schemes of recruiting. The Council of State seems to have failed, owing to Austro-German bad faith. The Warsaw Poles are not allowing themselves to be fooled. Even if they do raise a really national army under Austro-German auspices, the problem of United Poland still remains. Only Russian Poland is now "freed." The Poles still have before them the task of winning back Posnania from Germany and Galicia from Austria.

ation. Nearly one and one half million Poles are fighting on opposing sides, and another half million, of military age, are within the spheres of influence of the two groups of belligerents, and are being called upon to take arms "against the oppressor" in "liberating" armies. What Sir Roger Casement did in Germany is being done to-day among prisoners of war in all the prison camps of Europe. The invitation to treason (for it is treason to fight with the enemy against the nation of which one is a subject) is being given to Poles everywhere. The invitation is coupled with a threat. Both sides tell the unhappy Poles that if they do not now choose to "fight for Poland" the promises will naturally be withdrawn. As Germany and Austria have the greatest number of Polish prisoners and hold virtually all of what is ethnographically Polish ter-

ritory, the danger is greatest to Poles of Russian subjection who are at present at the mercy of the Central European Powers. There is only one way of safety, and that is for the Poles to stick resolutely, on technical grounds, to their present allegiance, and not to spoil the future by acting for one or the other of the belligerent groups. The people of Russian Poland may suffer at the hands of Germany by such a stand, but they will not lose in the long run. For if they are loyal to Russia during this period of trial, the self-respect of the Allies will never tolerate putting them back again under Russian slavery when the war is ended. Similarly, after what has happened in Ireland, the English people cannot hold against the Poles of Galicia and Posnania the fact that they remain loyal, for the duration of the war, to Austria and Germany.

All the world is longing for peace. We must begin now to prepare for the difficult task of making peace. A durable peace can come only through the determination of enlightened men throughout the whole world to see that justice is done to every race involved in the struggle. Otherwise, another treaty of Vienna or of Berlin will impose upon our children and our grandchildren a sacrifice of blood and treasure, and a burden of human suffering, similar to that which we are making and bearing during these years of horror.

Foremost among the problems to be solved is that of the future of Poland. There is only one satisfactory solution—the renascence of Poland as an independent state. Lovers of justice and friends of peace must work for this object with all their heart and soul. To this end, it behooves us to establish a propaganda of

information, free from bias and prejudice, so that the reasons for this only safe and just solution of the Polish problem be put clearly before those who are fighting, and those whose sympathy goes out to the fighters and the sufferers.

There are four considerations that we would do well to comprehend and ponder over in connection with the future of Poland.

1. The reconstituted Polish state must not be made subject in any way to Russia.

Notwithstanding the enormous amount of ink that is being used these days to prove that Russia is the "big sister" of the Slavs, it is certainly not true in connection with the Poles, and it is doubtful if it is true in connection with any Slavic nation. We cannot bank on what Russia some day may become. To-day she is far behind other European nations in civilization, and

will remain so as long as eighty per cent. of her population is illiterate. Her Government was yesterday a corrupt Oriental despotism, and what it will be to-morrow no man knows. The blood of her people is mixed, and the Asiatic strain is large and recent. During the period of constitutional development, her leaders are bound to show a narrow and fanatical nationalism, which makes impossible understanding of, or proper relations with, a subject nationality. The Poles, on the other hand, are a pure Slavic race, who have received their culture and laws and religion from the West. They have nothing in common with the Russians. As a part of the Russian Empire they would prove the same thorn in the flesh to the Russians of the twentieth century as they have been to the Russians of the nineteenth century. After the experiment of the last

hundred years, it is unwise to yoke together again two nations in a different stage of development, of different background, and with different ideals, making the more civilized nation the political inferior of its social inferior. It may be advanced that the "guarantee of Europe" would protect autonomous Poland from Russian bad faith and aggression. But is bitter experience no teacher? In a great political organism, only the relative feebleness of the predominant nationality safeguards the autonomy of other nationalities.

It is unsafe for the future of Europe to increase the dominions of Russia toward the west by the extension of the Russian sovereignty over German and Austrian Poland. This statement needs neither amplification nor argument to the thinking man.

2. The reconstituted Polish state must not be made subject in any way to Germany.

Germany, with less excuse than Russia (for she pretends to and actually does enjoy a far higher degree of civilization and enlightenment), has a black record of arrogance toward and intolerance of other nations whose legitimate aspirations have stood in the path of her political and commercial expansion. Her good faith cannot be depended upon. If Poland, either as a semi-independent or autonomous state, is placed under the tutelage of Germany, the Germans will leave no stone unturned to bind the Poles hand and foot. Although the new Polish state would have about fifteen million inhabitants, it would stand little chance of resisting Germany, for ninety per cent. of the Poles follow agricultural pursuits. Their industries

and commerce are almost entirely in the hands of Germans and Jews; so they would be powerless to use the weapon of economic boycott against Germany, and would gradually be assimilated by their powerful western neighbor. German statesmen and publicists know this fatal weakness of Poland, which can be remedied only by wholly independent national life. The Germans have studied their trump-cards, and do not hesitate to undertake the "management" of a united Poland!

The suggestion that re-united Poland be made a constituent member of the Hapsburg dominions is equally inimical to the realization of Polish aspirations. The present war has irrevocably committed Austria-Hungary to a common destiny with Teutonic Europe. Vienna and Budapest will continue to act with Berlin.

3. The boundaries of the reconstituted state must be determined not on historical grounds, but solely by conservative, unsentimental, ethnological considerations, and by sound economic and political considerations.

In this the Polish question is similar to many other questions that will come before the makers of the new map of Europe. The most perplexing problem of forming national boundaries, of reconciling conflicting national aspirations, is that of irredentism. Irredentism is a term used to describe the desire of states which have come into existence in the nineteenth century to extend their boundaries so as to include adjacent populations of the same race and language and adjacent territories which were in the past "historically" theirs. Most of the later states that have appeared on the map of Europe are

strongly influenced by irredentism. Irredentism is the cause of the antagonism and rivalry between the Balkan States. Irredentism is the cause of Italy's intervention in the war. It has also brought Rumania into the war. It is the disease which denatured the German people. It is the rock upon which Poland may be shipwrecked.

In solving irredentist difficulties, it is important to keep two facts in mind: that nationalism is a product of the nineteenth century; and that the formation and evolution of political organisms has been, and always will be, influenced fully as much by economic as by racial considerations. In dealing with the Balkan problem, I emphasize the cardinal fact that the various races of the Balkan peninsula were subjected to the Ottoman yoke centuries before the feeling of nationality was born in the European races. Therefore any

attempt to go back to tradition and historic claims in the formation of a modern state is illogical and mischievous. The Germans found this to their cost when they annexed Alsace and Lorraine.

They sowed the seed for another war. Will Italy attempt to saddle herself with a similar cause for inevitable future conflict with Teuton and Slav by trying to annex the territories at the head of the Adriatic? Will Rumania persist in her hope to cross the Carpathians?

One reads the abundant literature of Polish nationalists with misgiving and sinking of the heart. Poland went to her downfall as an independent nation by refusing to recognize the loss of territories on the west and northwest through the working of economic laws, and by diffusing her energies and making herself vulnerable through the extension of her po-

litical system over eastern and southeastern territories that could not be assimilated. In the last generations of her existence she went on the principle of all or nothing. The result was two partitions and nothing. It is altogether hopeless for the Poles of to-day to believe that they can include in their new Poland all their "historic" territories. No cataclysm of defeat, whichever way the fortune of war turns, is going to compel Germany and Russia to give up Silesia, the Prussian Baltic coast line, Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia, and it is doubtful if the Poles can make good their claim to the eastern portion of Galicia.[1] Even if economic and

[1] The Central Powers are attempting to limit Poland on the east and northeast by constituting Lithuania into an independent kingdom, which it historically was before the union with Poland. Eastern Galicia, outside of the city of Lemberg, is overwhelmingly Ruthenian in population, and attached to the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) of the limitrophe Russian provinces. The Ukrainian movement demands the separation of the southwest prov-

political considerations do not militate against the Polish claims to these territories, the hard facts of present ethnological conditions are not in favor of Poles.

Many patriotic Poles who read these words will think either that I am misinformed and an ignoramus, or that I have at heart no real sympathy with or under-

inces from Russia, including the cities of Kieff and Odessa. The Ruthenians or Ukrainians tell us that they are a nation distinct from both Russians and Poles, and far greater in number than the latter. Like the Lithuanians, they, too, have their history of days before the Polish and Russian conquests. When we go into the history of national movements in eastern Europe, we see that Russia is as much a composite empire as is Austria-Hungary. If the demands and sufferings of these races in subjection to Russia are less known than the similar aspirations and persecutions of the races subject to the Hapsburgs, it is only because they have been less advertised. In the first month of the Russian Revolution, a surprisingly large number of Ukrainians demonstrated in the streets of Petrograd, demanding that their national claims be recognized by the new Government. The Russian Socialists—at present in control—favor federalism as the underlying principle of the Russian republic, and are inclined to encourage national revendications of Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, etc.

standing of Polish aspirations. I am not able here to elaborate the arguments against unreasonable Polish irredentism. But how can you argue with the man who, when you point out to him that the population of Dantsic is only four per cent. Polish, replies, "We have been under the German yoke: now they must taste ours"? His mind is fixed not only upon unrealities, but also upon impossibilities. Who is going to force Russia and Germany to give up "historic" Polish territories, and some of them lost centuries before the first partition? Certainly not the Poles, or the rest of Europe combined. Never in the history of the world has it been more imperative for us all to face cold facts than it is to-day. Irredentism, except where it is a question of a homogeneous population whose economic interests would be favored by union with the "mother coun-

try," has nothing in common with facts and logic.

Possible independent Poland would include about two thirds of Posnania from Germany; the kingdom of Poland, including Khelm, from Russia; and Galicia, excluding the eastern territory known as Red Ruthenia, from Austria. It is conceivable that the issue of the war may compel, or persuade, the three partitioners of Poland to yield these territories to an independent Polish state.

4. The reconstitution of Poland as an independent state is not only a wise political step in establishing a durable peace, but is also an act of justice to one of the largest and best races of Europe, which has purchased the right to be free by heroic sacrifices willingly made and by the ability amply demonstrated to survive and thrive through four generations of persecution.

Poland is the best example of the wisdom of the buffer-state theory. Russia and Germany, the largest and most powerful states in Europe, have been endeavoring to expand each in the direction of the other. The partition of Poland was long held to be the bond that kept peace between them, for they were partners in crime. But their common frontier eventually brought them into conflict. German statesmen and publicists have frequently told me since the beginning of the war that the underlying as well as the direct cause of the present conflict was the ever-present nightmare of the Panslavic "Westward-ho!" and that the Germans were fighting for European civilization against "Asiatic" invasion. On the other hand, Russian polemicists claim that the Teutonic *Drang nach Osten* is the basic cause of the war, from the point of view

of their particular national interest. If this be true, as far as the issue between Germany and Russia is concerned, why not restore Poland to her traditional historic past as the defender of Slavs against Teutons, and the outpost of Occidental Europe against invasion from the East?

The creation of an artificial buffer state, closely allied in race and sympathies with one or the other of the rival Powers, or too weak to resist her neighbors, would be a makeshift and a farce. But the Poles are neither pro-German nor pro-Russian, nor are they weak. In numbers, in brains, in vitality, in wealth, in unity of spirit, they are stronger to-day than ever in their history, and as an independent nation would very rapidly become the seventh "Great Power" of Europe. In considering the fitness of the Poles for independence, it is just as absurd to hark back

to the weakness and the faults of Poland of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as to judge Germany and Italy of to-day by the Germans and Italians of two hundred years ago. It is what the Poles are to-day that counts. Poland was partitioned before the Poles became a nation. Their birth as a nation has come in the period of bondage. Now they are ready to break the bonds, for they have arrived at the age of manhood which Talleyrand prophesied.

The Poles were once as enlightened and cultivated a people as any in Europe. They have come back to their former place in Galicia. In Posnania they have confounded every effort of German *Kultur* and *organization* to assimilate them, and in the face of Prussian Landtag, Prussian officials, and Prussian schoolmasters, they have gained in lands, in wealth, and in

knowledge of their own language and literature since 1898. In Russian Poland economic and political handicaps have brought an increasing degree of superiority in wealth and culture to their oppressors.

There are more Poles to-day in the world than ever before, and their fecundity is unrivaled. Their national feeling was never deeper-rooted and more intelligent. If a Pole tells you he is in favor of autonomy under Germany or Russia or Austria, he is lying for expediency's sake, or he is a Jew, or he has some narrow, selfish business interest stronger than patriotism. The Poles want only one thing, and that is independence. In this are they not like every other nation worth its salt? Would you not despise them if they did not long for that which you yourself hold to be the most precious thing in the world?

"Are you a patriot?" said Napoleon in 1810 to John Sniadecki, rector of the University of Vilna.

"Sire," answered the Rector, "from my birth I have learned to love my country, and her misfortunes have only strengthened the love I bear for her."

After an additional century of Poland's misfortunes, her children, scattered over the whole world, would give the same answer. And there are seven times as many of them now as there were then.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NEAR EAST

CONSTANTINOPLE: PAWN OR PRINCIPLE?

"The society of nations must hereafter be based upon the principle of the equality of peoples and their right to govern themselves in accordance with their aspirations, without being molested by more powerful neighbors. This is the thesis of the Allies as well as of President Wilson. The organization of Europe on the basis of the principle of nationalities is the negation of the right of conquest. The Balkan populations have not been delivered from the Turkish yoke to fall under German guardianship."—*Editorial in the Paris "Temps," January 29, 1917.*

FOR some years, during the precious months I was able to spend in Paris between trips, I pursued a hobby that did not put money in my purse or fresh air in my lungs. But the spell of it held me

even after the outbreak of war. Residence and travel in the near East had awakened interest in the history of the Ottoman Empire and Constantinople. There was not the leisure to wander through centuries: so I chose the period when the Osmanlis, a new race in history, spread their power through the Balkans and closed in upon the capital of the Byzantine Empire. In the Bibliothèque Nationale, from nine in the morning until four in the afternoon, I lived in the fourteenth century. Events since 1914 are strikingly reminiscent of that period: the anxiety of Europe over what was going on at Constantinople; ambassadors at the Sublime Porte striving, for the sake of keeping open or cutting off the Black Sea, to win to their side the nation that held the key to the straits; the occupation of Tenedos by the maritime power that

would brook no rival; the effort to reach Constantinople by way of Gallipoli peninsula; and the seizure of Saloniki to induce the Greeks to march on the side of the seizer. Two days before France mobilized for the Great War, I ordered from my German bookseller in Paris the latest book on the question of the succession to Constantinople. It was by the Rumanian minister to Belgium. M. Djuvara described one hundred and one schemes that had been conceived and elaborated in Europe during the last four centuries to take Constantinople from the Turks, and put the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles under European control.

From the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji in 1774, to the treaty of Berlin in 1878, Russia was the powerful claimant to Constantinople. She fought three wars to attain her goal. Against Russian preten-

sions stood the two Occidental Powers. Great Britain was the consistent defender of the Turks. France maintained an attitude hostile to Russian aspirations. Even when Napoleon, at the height of his power, was planning to divide the world with Alexander, he could not reconcile himself to the idea of Muscovite domination at the place where Europe and Asia meet.

Since 1878, new defenders of Ottoman integrity against the Russians have arisen. The Central European Powers, Italy, Austria, and Germany, achieved their national unity in the two decades preceding the treaty of Berlin. Hemmed in on the west by Great Britain and France and on the east by Russia, born too late to extend their political sovereignty over vast colonial domains, and unable (if only for lack of coaling-stations) to develop sea-power greater than that of their rivals, nothing

was more natural than the German and Austro-Hungarian conception of a *Drang nach Osten* through the Balkan peninsula, over the bridge of Constantinople, into the markets of Asia. The geographical position of the Central European states made as inevitable a penetration policy into the Balkans and Turkey as the geographical position of England made inevitable the development of an overseas empire. Since Lord Beaconsfield forced the treaty of Berlin upon Russia by a threat of war, British foreign policy has changed. The integrity of the Ottoman Empire became of secondary interest to the British from the moment they gained control of Egypt and realized what the Suez Canal meant to them. Gradually Germany and Austria-Hungary have drifted into the position of protectors of Turkey. For France made an alliance with Russia, the traditional

enemy of Turkey, and it became increasingly evident, especially since the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, that British statesmen, in spite of the pledge implied in the occupation of Cyprus, no longer held as sacrosanct the policy of the maintenance of Ottoman integrity.

Another complication has developed in the question of Constantinople since the treaty of Berlin. The Balkan Christian states, created to be dependent upon the Great Powers, asserted their independence. Rumania increased in population and wealth. Bulgaria and Greece ignored the limitations imposed upon them territorially and politically by the treaty of Berlin. Little Montenegro on more than one occasion defied all the Powers. Serbia, with Russian backing, began to make trouble for Austria-Hungary, and Serbian and Italian irredentism clashed on

the Adriatic littoral. At the mouth of the Adriatic Greek aspirations were irreconcilable with those of Italy. The war that liberated the Christians of the Balkans from the bondage reimposed upon them by the treaty of Berlin would have defeated both Austro-Hungarian and Russian ambitions had not the war broken out over the partition of the conquered territory. By refusing to allow Greece and Serbia and Montenegro to divide Albania, the Great Powers were directly responsible for the second Balkan War. Had Serbia been permitted to retain the outlet to the Adriatic she conquered by arms, she would not have broken her treaty with Bulgaria, and Macedonian territorial claims could have been adjusted. By listening to the remonstrances of Vienna and Rome, the conference of ambassadors at London thought they would avoid a

European war. On the contrary, they made it inevitable.

No impartial student of the diplomatic correspondence during the momentous twelve days that precipitated the war can fail to attach the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities to Berlin and Vienna. The evidence published by the Central Powers alone—their official documents put forth in the form of special pleading—are all one wants to refute the laborious defense that has been attempted by the German polemicists. Why then do I speak of the war as *inevitable?* It is because the explanation of the developments of the twelve days and the precipitation of the crisis must be sought in events that preceded the Sarajevo assassination. War does not arise from technicalities, and from the ill will and bad faith of certain diplomats during a few days. Let us

throw aside the defense of the German and Austro-Hungarian foreign offices during the twelve days—a defense weak to the point of absurdity. Had the statesmen of the Central Powers justification for adopting — perhaps unconsciously — the uncompromising attitude that Russia must not interfere in the Austrian punishment of Serbia, and that if Russia did interfere, and the Great War was precipitated, it would come better now than later, since it had to come? The Central Powers maintained that Serbia was a foyer of Panslavic propaganda, which, if unchecked, would menace the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and destroy the power of Teutonic Europe to keep open the path to the East and to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russia. Were they right, or were their fears groundless? We cannot answer this question yet; for

its answer depends upon whether the Entente Powers regard Constantinople in the light of principle or as a pawn.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire would have gone the way of all other empires the world has known had it not been for the rivalry of those who coveted the inheritance. Since the Congress of Vienna, Turkey has been a constant source of friction in European international relations. Because of Turkey, wars have been fought and alliances formed and shifted that influenced the destinies of nations which had no interest, directly or indirectly, in the face of Turkey. Statesmen in European capitals, in the endeavor to solve the question of the Orient to what they believed was the advantage of their own nation and to prevent its solution to what they believed was the advantage of

another nation, have not hesitated to play navies and armies on the diplomatic chessboard, to excite ill feeling among peoples who had no reason to be enemies of one another, and to use cynically the force behind them for the purpose of keeping in slavery the small Christian races of the Balkan peninsula and Asiastic Turkey.

One would be unwilling to assert that public opinion in any European nation knowingly sanctioned the crimes and knowingly supported the blunders of the diplomats. Governments have been sustained in their fratricidal strife over the Turkish succession because the public has been kept in ignorance or misinformed. One is astonished at the lack of knowledge shown by the people who create governments in the questions their representatives are called upon to face and solve. Parliaments, also, are not cognizant of the

most vital issues and agreements of international diplomacy. One almost despairs of the working of democracy when he studies European diplomatic history since the days of universal suffrage. The only change is that the people elect their autocrats. The men they have elevated to power are just as irresponsible and as rebellious to democratic control as were kings.

One can go beyond the statement of an ignorant and misinformed electorate to set forth the ignorance and misinformation of the elected. A striking illustration of this is the action of the British cabinet when the Russians imposed upon Turkey the treaty of San Stefano. To destroy this treaty, the British were willing to allow themselves to be led into a war as foolish and as futile as the Crimean War had proved to be, less than a quarter of a cen-

tury before. Beaconsfield and Salisbury declared that they had come back from Berlin bringing peace with honor. Yet it was not long until Salisbury confessed that they had "backed the wrong horse"! Freycinet took upon himself the responsibility of depriving France, by a decision formed from imperfect knowledge and without consultation, of the work of two generations in Egypt and the fruits of the vision of the builder and backers of the Suez Canal. Ever since the treaty of Berlin, France and Great Britain have been badly served by their foreign offices and their diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans.

On October 23, 1916, Lord Grey, speaking at a luncheon of the foreign newspaper correspondents in London, said:

In what spirit is the war being conducted

by the Allies? We shall struggle until we have established the supremacy of right over force and until we have assured the free development in conditions of equality and conformity to their own genius, of all the states, large and small, who constitute civilized humanity. . . . We shall continue our sacrifices until we have assured the future peace of the whole European continent.

Although the application of the principle of nationality is extremely difficult in countries where the population is mixed, and where the most numerous element has neither the wealth nor the education of the minority, nor the minority's bond of attachment to a neighboring larger state, it is manifest that if an equitable and durable peace is to be secured within every existing political unit and in each natural and economic and geographical section, the majority must be considered. Only thus can the settlement be regarded as the

triumph of right over force. Otherwise nationality will remain as it has been in the past and as it is now—a principle to be applied where it is to the interest of the dominant group of belligerents to apply it, and to be disregarded where it is to the interest of the victorious Powers to disregard it. If the new map of Europe is to be made by right and not by force, as Lord Grey and all other French and British statesmen have asserted, the same principle must be applied everywhere. Not only would it be a mockery of justice, but it would be an impugnment of the good faith of the Entente Powers before history and the leaving of questions unsettled for another test of arms if the aspirations of all the belligerent Powers and the claims of all the little states are not decided upon the same principle.

Liberal public opinion in France and

Great Britain needs to be enlightened concerning the Balkan and Turkish settlements.[1] If the press continues to be

[1] The most important newspapers in France, which are read by the élite of the nation, are full of half-truths and untruths in regard to the condition of affairs in eastern Europe. Since the beginning of the war, no French newspaper, either in the news columns or editorially, has presented the problems of the Balkan States and of Austro-Hungarian and Russian subject nationalities in accordance with the facts, as they are commonly known by students and travelers. There are many thoughtful, accurately written, and clearly developed books on eastern and southeastern Europe available in the French language. But if ever read, they are now forgotten, and editors give their readers amazing misinformation about Russia and Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. The quotation from the Paris "Temps" at the head of this article is taken from an editorial commenting upon a recent interview given by Premier Bratiano to a "Temps" correspondent. The words are noble, and we subscribe fully to the elevated sentiment. But the "Temps" does not tell its readers that less than half the population of Transylvania and only a third of the population of the Bukowina are Rumanians, and that even among the Rumanians of the Dual Monarchy only a small class, which is without great influence, wants union with Rumania. The "Temps" has never informed its readers of the nature and meaning of Russian and Italian aspirations in the Balkans, and of the betrayal of the principle of nationalities by French and British statesmen to satisfy those aspirations.

muzzled by the censorship after the armistice is signed, and if the delegates who go to the peace conference are bound by agreements contracted during the war for the sake of expediency and are uncontrolled by the democracies they represent, will not the sacrifices of this terrible war have been in vain? The happiness of the nations of the Balkan peninsula and of the races of the Ottoman Empire is not going to be secured by the division among the victors of the territories in which they live. The worst blunder made by Entente diplomacy since the beginning of the war, in regard to the near East, was the public statement by M. Delcassé that Constantinople was promised to Russia. M. Trepoff, prime minister of Russia, confirmed this statement later in a speech to the Duma. Who promised Constantinople to Russia, and why? What fair-

minded man can blame Bulgarians and Greeks and Turks for not regarding the Russian menace as less formidable than the German menace? The Balkan States do not want Austria-Hungary in Albania. But neither do they want Italy there. It would be disastrous for them to have Germany in Constantinople. But it would be equally disastrous for them to have Russia there. If the principle of nationality calls Rumania to free Transylvania from the Hungarians, it calls her with equal force to free Bessarabia from the Russians. If Rumania's act in joining the Entente Powers, following a similar act under similar circumstances and for similar reasons by Italy, was glorious and noble and self-sacrificing, why should Bulgaria's analogous act be treason and felony? What benefit would the Greeks derive from the possession of Smyrna, across the

sea from their own mainland and with a large *hinterland* to be defended, if they were to have the Italians in Epirus and the Russians in Thrace? Greece was offered overseas territory at the expense of seeing great Powers installed in contiguous territory with splendid naval bases.

There are two arguments for giving Constantinople to Russia: (1) Russia must be rewarded for her help in crushing Germany, and the Turks punished for joining the Germans; (2) Russia is hemmed in on all sides, and has a right to control her sole and natural outlet to the world. Both of these arguments regard Constantinople as a pawn, and both reveal what has been consistently held up to us as the typically Prussian point of view. The mental attitude is detestable: for it is a selfish one, and does not take into consideration at all the feelings or the rights

or the interests of others. The reasoning is inadmissible: for it attacks the foundation of international morality and the only possible basis of a stable world peace.

If the Turks went into the war because they were wrongly led by a few men whom Germany bribed, they are to be pitied instead of punished. The way to correct the evil is to get after the men of whom the Turkish nation were the dupes, and not to put the Turks in subjection to Russia. If the Turks went into the war because they felt that their national existence was imperilled by Russian schemes of aggrandizement, they had as much right to take up arms as France had, and the only reason for depriving them of liberty would be right of conquest, which, up to this time, has been the justification for holding alien races in political bondage. The prev-

alence of this reasoning in the peace conference would mean that this war will go down to posterity as others of history—a struggle for booty, which the victors shared. If Russia ought to have Constantinople because she helped to defeat Germany, the war is not being fought in the spirit described by Lord Grey or for the ends claimed by Lord Grey.

A very keen Frenchman recently said to me: "You do not realize that Russia is a vital factor in our hope and determination to crush Germany. Therefore, we must keep quiet about Poland, and we must agree to Russia's demands in the near East. Our one thought is the safety, now and in the future, of France, and the necessities of the situation alone guide the near-Eastern policy of the Entente Powers."

"But is not this the *Notwendigkeit* ar-

gument of Bethmann-Hollweg?" I remonstrated.

The Frenchman smiled sadly. "It always comes to that in war," was his answer.

The second argument for the Russian occupation of Constantinople—and this is presented most strongly to the French and British public—is that Russia must control her southern outlet to the sea. The Pacific outlet is thousands of miles across the continent of Asia. The Arctic outlet is ice-bound during the greater part of the year. The Baltic outlet is at the mercy of Germany. The lessons of the present war are used to demonstrate the peril of Russia's windpipe being held by a hostile Power. It is argued that Russia is pushing her way by irresistible economic forces seaward, and that if she does not get now under her control the path to the sea she

will inevitably disturb the world's peace later to do so. A prominent liberal and independent review in England recently published an article which proves—to the satisfaction of its writer—that a few million people in the way of a great and growing nation must not be allowed to disturb the bonds uniting the British and Russian peoples. The Balkan and Ottoman races must be made to understand that they cannot block the way to the reconstruction of Europe along the lines determined by the Entente Powers. Their geographical position makes necessary subjection to Russia. One can find no difference between this reasoning and that of the German *Weltpolitik* champions. It bears the stamp of Berlin and Leipsic and Jena. It is the kind of argument by which the Germans justified in 1864 the conquest of Schleswig-Holstein, and plead

to-day for the permanent inclusion of Belgium in the German Empire.[1] It is the underlying motive of the Austro-Hungarian conquest of Serbia. The weak must stand aside for the strong!

If the economic-outlet-to-the-Mediterranean argument is a justifiable reason for subjugating alien races, and bringing them under a government they abhor, and if a few millions must bow before a hundred millions, the retention of Triest and

[1] Foreign Secretary Zimmerman, in the note to neutral governments of January 31, 1917, announcing Germany's intention to initiate unrestricted submarine warfare, said: "As regards Belgium, for which the United States has warm sympathy, the Imperial Chancellor declared a few weeks previously that it had never been among Germany's intentions to annex Belgium." But we cannot, unfortunately, accept this statement as an expression of German public opinion. Long before the war, German historians and geographers taught that Belgium was a part of *Deutschtum,* and would eventually be brought within the German Empire. German irredentism is like Italian irredentism in almost every particular, origin, causes, reasons of late development, basis of claims, methods of propaganda among the people.

Fiume by Austrians and Hungarians is also a necessity, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation of 1908 was a wise policy, inspired by the desire to assure the peace of Europe! Advocates of allowing Russia to take Constantinople declare that they are backing Russia because they sincerely desire to reconstruct Europe along lines that take into account economic necessities and that are laid down in the view of avoiding another cataclysm for the next generation to face and suffer from. Very good. But how, then, can they logically support the Adriatic pretentions of Italy and the disappearance of German influence in the Balkans? If they do support both Russian and Italian claims, they are either insincere or are suffering through the bitter passions of the moment from a loss of the power of clear thinking.

The argument against the Russian oc-

cupation of Constantinople are unanswerable. Only those who adopt the German mental attitude or who are so anxious to defend the Russian point of view that they forget they are at the same time pleading for the German point of view, can combat them. Since the war began no article has been written advocating Russia at Constantinople which has not furnished material for German polemicists and weapons for German diplomats. The harm done to the cause of the Entente Powers in the Balkans by thoughtless writers in Paris and London, who saw only one move in the great game and believed they were helping the common cause by encouraging Russian aspirations, has been incalculable.

Too much writing about Constantinople and too little writing about Poland gave the German propaganda in eastern Eu-

rope and southeastern Europe the chance to instil doubt of the good faith of France and Great Britain. Did not the statesmen of the Occidental Powers tell the world that they took up the sword in defense of small nationalities? It is because I am in perfect sympathy with the ideal so clearly and unequivocally set forth by Lord Grey that I regard the arguments against the Russian occupation of Constantinople as unanswerable. Lord Grey said, "We shall struggle until we have established the supremacy of right over force and until we have assured the free development, in conditions of equality and conformity to their own genius, of all the states, large and small, who constitute civilized humanity." Unless Lord Grey believes that the Balkan States and the Ottoman subject races do not form a part of "civilized humanity," he—and all who

have applauded his beautiful and soul-stirring setting forth of the cause of the Entente Powers—must agree that the arguments against the Russian occupation of Constantinople are unanswerable.

Here are the arguments. I speak not from books, but from personal, intimate knowledge gained by years of travel and residence in the near East.

1. There is not a single element, Christian or Moslem, among those that make up the population of the Balkans and of the Ottoman Empire that desires Russian sovereignty, and there is no Russian element at all in Constantinople or anywhere around the straits. Pro-Russians do not exist in the near East, especially in Constantinople. In virtually every other debatable or contested territory in Europe, I have found partizans of the Power or Powers that were ambitious of over-

throwing the existing political status to their advantage. Considerations that make partizans are religious, political, and economic. Some point of contact is found and fostered by the outside propaganda. But Russia has no local support in Constantinople. None feels that his particular political, religious, or economic interests would be benefited by Russian occupation. On the contrary, the most bitter enemies of the Turks, and those who have suffered most at the hands of the Turks, never hesitate to tell you frankly that they prefer the *status quo* to a change in favor of Russia. The reasons for this are easily set forth. The Turks are occasional oppressors. While they can be—and sometimes are—annoying and harmful through arrogance and inefficiency and maladministration, for the most part and for most of the time they allow Christian

subjects and foreigners as much liberty as they would have anywhere else in the world to carry on their business and amass wealth. The British and French residents are of this opinion.[1] In Constantinople and along the shores of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles are probably as many people as in Serbia. Just as strongly as the Serbians do not want Austro-Hungarian domination, these people do not want Russian domination. The Entente Powers are fighting to free Serbia. We applaud and second the efforts of the liberators. By the same token, Turks and Greeks and Jews and Armenians of Constantinople

[1] It is possible to find at the present moment former Constantinopolitans of French and British nationality who declare that Russia must have Constantinople. They do this from the mistaken notion that the interest of their nations demands this sacrifice, and they are looking at the problem from the point of view of Paris and London. The statement in no way represents their real opinion as Constantinopolitans.

and the straits can cite the ideal of the Entente Powers, and claim our sympathy and support in their common determination not to undergo the Russian yoke.

If we consider the vital interests of the people of Asia Minor and the Balkans, who are equally unanimous in their opposition to Russia at Constantinople, the two millions increases to a formidable number of perhaps thirty millions. Rumania's only outlet to the world is through the straits, and Bulgaria's principal outlet is through the straits. The commerce of the Greeks is largely dependent upon the straits. These Balkan States have every bit as much reason for not wanting to see Russia at Constantinople as the British have for not wanting to see Germany at Antwerp. Who would dare to assert that Russian control of the straits would "assure the free develop-

ment, in conditions of equality and conformity to their own genius," of the Balkan States?

2. Russia at Constantinople would make impossible a logical and equitable, and hence a durable, establishment of world peace. In the admirable discourses of MM. Viviani, Briand, Poincaré, Lord Grey, and Messrs. Asquith and Lloyd George, there is a plea that has won for the Entente Powers world-wide sympathy. We are taken to the mountain-tops, and shown a new era of world history, in which right rules in the place of force. We have not regarded the discourses as the rhetoric of polemicists and the ideal as impracticable; for we believe in the sincerity of the speakers and in the soundness of the program set forth by them as a means of attaining the goal for which the nations they represent are fight-

ing. The peace they intend to give the world will be durable, because it is to be logical and equitable. Therefore, we do not consider the question of granting Constantinople to Russia from the point of view of military reward or expediency or Russia's own interest. It is a matter primarily of Balkan and Ottoman interest, and secondarily of world interest. Is a peace that means Russian sovereignty of Constantinople logical? Is it equitable?

It is not logical. The sequels of past international treaties clearly indicate the fallacy of artificial settlements made at the point of the bayonet. When a nation accepts a peace dictated by victorious enemies along the lines of the particular interests of the victors, it is simply a matter of yielding to *force majeure*. The preparation for the day of revenge begins immediately. Let us not forget that the

war broke out over the question of Serbian independence. What is the issue between the Entente Powers and Germany in regard to Constantinople? If the Entente Powers are fighting to prevent Constantinople from falling into Germany's hands, and to save the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire from subjugation to Germany, they are justified in their action, from the world's point of view, and are contributing to the world's peace only if they refrain from using their victory to do exactly what they fought to prevent Germany from doing. The allies of Russia, in the near-Eastern theater of the war, are under the imperative necessity of persuading Russia to declare her disinterestedness in Constantinople.[1] Otherwise,

[1] Whatever excuse of expediency may have dictated the policy of Great Britain and France in this question, as in the Polish question, up to March, 1917, there is no excuse since the Russian Revolution for refusing to

their contention that they are fighting for a durable peace breaks down. There is no durable peace for the near East in shutting out Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians to let in Russians. There is no durable peace for the world in increasing the Muscovite power in Europe. We have dreams of a regenerated, democratic, civilized Russia. The world needs that sort of Russia. But can we expect it

speak out frankly upon the subject of the future of Constantinople. What is the solution that has been agreed upon by France and Great Britain? Why was M. Miliukoff urged by Paris and London to stick to the old agreement made with the Czar, when the elements in Russia responsible for the revolution declared that the New Russia would have none of Constantinople or any other conquest? M. Miliukoff, who has the mentality of the Young Turks, is a liberal for Russians—not for other races. His aggressive and impenitent nationalism almost brought Russia to civil war in the second month of the new régime. M. Kerensky, Minister of Justice, made a categorical statement against the continuation of the Czarist policy of conquests, specifying Constantinople as an aspiration Revolutionary Russia could not sponsor. M. Miliukoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that Constantinople was as

after a triumphant war has added to the empire, already so large that its democratic evolution is seriously handicapped, territories inhabited by hostile aliens? If we do, we are believers in chimeras, and deny the universal experience of mankind.

It is not equitable. Unless we are going to see disappear from the Great War the glamour of idealism, principle, not expediency and national interest, must be kept steadily in view as the goal of the struggle. The statesmen of the Entente Powers interpret the spirit in which their nations are fighting and the spirit in which they envisage the problems of peace as that of right and justice. They have set out to overthrow militarism, to disprove the

much the dream of New Russia as of Old Russia. This led to M. Miliukoff's dismissal, and an official declaration to Russia's allies and the world that Russia now desired a peace "without annexations and without indemnities."

obnoxious axiom that might goes before right. They are not fighting for themselves, but for humanity. They are the defenders of small nationalities. Very well, then. In their agreement not to sign a separate peace, the Entente Powers must have laid down as the basis of the peace the right of every nation, once freed from the German yoke and the German menace, to decide its own destinies.

France and Great Britain are the splendid examples of nations that have developed to their present degree of civilization and enlightenment because they have evolved through many generations into democracies. By arms the two peoples have overthrown their autocrats and defended their soil from alien domination. They have frequently had to repeal invaders. Each has tried to conquer the other. Within the memory of the present

generation they have been on the verge of war. They have gone through a laborious period of interior assimilation, civil wars, anarchy, that extended through centuries. For Frenchmen and Englishmen to cite the antagonism between the Balkan races, and the events of the last thirty years since the power of Turkey was weakened in the Balkan peninsula, as reasons for putting the Balkan States under foreign domination or "protection," is illogical and unfair. Do they expect babies to become men without passing through the period of childhood, and then, forgetting their own slow, painful, uncertain development, are they going to declare the right of others to potential manhood forfeited because of the faults of childhood? Great Britain could never have become what she is to-day if France had controlled her destinies. Nor could France have become

what she is to-day under British guidance. Do French and British believe that it is equitable to attempt to force Russian domination upon the races of the near East? Certainly not! I can hear now Premier Viviani's ringing words: "Every small nation has the right to live its own life, and it is the glory of France that we are going into this war to defend Serbia and Belgium from the German covetousness." And Mr. Asquith, "We shall not lay down the sword until we have established a just peace on the basis of the liberty of small nations."

In the reconstruction of Europe, if Constantinople is to be regarded in the light of principle and not as a pawn, the Great Powers, when they come to the peace conference, will adopt the formula of Lord Grey in dealing with the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, just as they will adopt

that formula in dealing with Belgium, Poland, and the Slavic elements of Austria-Hungary. Heretofore, in every international conference since the Congress of Vienna set the example of the strong using the weak as pawns, unfortunate subject races have seen their national aspirations discussed and decided wholly on grounds of expediency and of the interest of the big fellows who acted on the principle that might was right.

The Great Powers, after each war, have remade the map of Europe without the slightest regard for the principle of the "free development, in conditions of equality and conformity to their own genius, of all the states, large and small." Poles and Finns, Czechs and Croatians, Serbians and Bulgarians, Greeks and Rumanians, Turks and Arabs, Armenians and Syrians, have seen the

lands in which they live and their national aspirations used as pawns. Diplomats have put them forward to block the game of other diplomats, and sacrificed them without compunction, when they thought there was any advantage in doing so. With the exception of Waddington, the French representative at the Congress of Berlin, there has not been in a hundred years a representative of a Great Power at a peace conference who, in action as well as word, was inspired in the slightest degree with the spirit Lord Grey has set forth as that which imbues the Entente Powers in the present hour. Many diplomats, even at peace conferences, have spoken beautiful words about the little fellows; but their vote has invariably shown cynical and deliberately calculated selfishness.

If there is to be any change in the spirit

and in the result of the next peace conference, it will come only through the adoption of Lord Grey's noble ideal as a basis of settlement. The great nations will consider the interests of the little nations as they consider their own interests, and they will regard national aspirations and national revendications in the light of principle, judging all alike and refuse to play weaker nations as pawns. This is idealism, this is humanitarianism, this is self-abnegation; and I suppose many who read these lines will laugh at what they call my naïveté. But I have a right to view the near-Eastern question from the idealistic point of view: for the Entente Powers have struck that keynote. They must hold to it and not be carried away by the lust of conquest. Otherwise their children and ours will weep the bitter tears we are weeping to-day, and bear anew

the grievous burdens of the present generation.

An exiled Napoleon, and the destruction of a military machine about which things were felt and written a hundred years ago curiously like what is being felt and written to-day, did not bring peace and harmony to Europe. No more will an exiled kaiser and the collapse of the Prussian militarism bring peace to-day.

Far be it from me to discount the indignation that demands chastisement and reparation for what has happened since 1914. For I have lived in the midst of the suffering since the first day of the war, and know what it means. But the violation of Belgian neutrality, and the brutal reign of terror visited upon an unoffending people through the German invasion, was not to me, as to most of those who saw and wrote, an unprecedented event in con-

temporary annals, and the beginning of the horrible precipitation of Europe into hell. It was not a new story. It was only another chapter in a story that had been unfolding for some years, and of which I have been an eyewitness. Only those were surprised and shocked who did not know about the earlier chapters. In 1909, in one city of Asia Minor, I saw within a few days more civilians butchered than have been killed in all of Belgium during more than two years of war. The Armenians were just as much under the treaty protection of the European Powers as were the Belgians. Not a single Power that had signed the Treaty of Berlin made an official protest to Turkey. From 1904 to 1914, the near East was in a turmoil. What was the attitude of European diplomacy? Disregard of the legitimate aspirations of small nations;

indifference to human suffering through war and oppression; the making of every move in negotiations for the advantage of the movers, and with never a thought of the interest of the moved. Students of history in the face of a world war must adopt the attitude of physicians in the face of an epidemic. If physicians limit their attention to specific cases, and think only of curing the disease when it manifests itself, they keep getting new cases. To stamp out the disease they must hunt for the germs. A regenerated Germany, or a Germany chastised and powerless, will in no way destroy the germs that make for war. International diplomacy must be born again in the spirit of Lord Grey's program. International diplomacy must renounce the spirit of self-seeking, and remake Europe in such a way as to "assure the free development, in conditions of

equality and conformity to their own genius, of all nations, great and small."

As in the case of Poland, so in the case of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. The Entente Powers, at the end of the third year of the Great War, have come to the parting of the ways. If they stick by their original program, and hold fast to the ideals that have made their cause precious to lovers of humanity throughout the world, there is glorious hope for the future, and they cannot expect to keep and increase the sympathy and support of neutral nations—a sympathy and support that grows more precious, invaluable indeed, as the European conflict reaches its climax. But if, on the other hand, they are tempted by lust of conquest engendered in the heat of conflict, or if they yield to expediency, so easily confused with right when every nerve is strained to

win, the durable peace becomes a castle in Spain. Lovers of France and the advocates of Anglo-Saxon solidarity ought to urge with all their heart and soul that Constantinople be considered in the light of principle and not as a pawn. It is only one of several issues where a choice has to be made. But Constantinople is in its potentialities the most important issue, and in its unmistakable clearness the test issue.

EUROPE AND ISLAM

In the fourteenth century, the West had already begun to try to impose its commerce, its customs, its laws, and its religion on the East. There was not, nor has there ever been since, a sympathetic "give and take" between Occident and Orient. In a mint, if the coin when stamped does not correspond exactly to the mold, it is rejected. Similarly the West, when it tries to put every Eastern people through its mold and finds no exact correspondence, rejects. Hence, on the one side, the scorn of assumed superiority: on the other side, a hatred not only born of fear and of conviction of inferiority in material things, but of a sense of injustice which is none the less vital from a knowledge that the wrong is not, and will not be, righted.—*The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, page 132.*

DURING the thousand years between the battle of Tours and the battle of Vienna, which marked the extreme

advance of Islam in western and eastern Europe, Mohammedan states and Mohammedan races were a constant menace to the security and prosperity of Europe, because of their military strength, their control of the Mediterranean, and the temptation alliance with them afforded to European states to strike at one another to the detriment of Christianity and civilization. In the decadence of Islam, Mohammedan states have remained a menace to the development of European civilization and to international harmony and understanding. Their flags no longer float on the Mediterranean. Their military power is broken. But their very impotence makes them more dangerous than ever before. They are more susceptible to diplomatic intrigues. Their defenselessness has kept whetted the territorial appetite of the European Powers. Some

choice morsels have already been devoured: Russia was eating steadily until she reached Armenia across the Caucasus in 1878; and France and England did not stop for half a century until Tunis was consumed in 1881 and Egypt in 1882; Austria revived the European traditions of the generation before in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908; Italy and France in Tripoli and Morocco in 1911.

And after the present war—what more? Russia already has her hands on the rest of Armenia, and has publicly stated that her allies have "awarded" to her Constantinople in the future treaty; French public opinion claims Syria; Great Britain, ensconced in Mesopotamia, making desperate efforts, has reached Bagdad; Persia is the scene of bitter struggles between the belligerents, none of whom have paid the slightest attention to Persian protests

against the violation of her neutrality; Italy makes no secret of her intentions in regard to Albania, and is credited with ambitions in Macedonia to the detriment of Bulgaria and Greece; and Germany, with one foot on Belgium and the other on Serbia, declares her own territorial disinterestedness, and claims to be the protector of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the sole friend left to Islam.

When one is writing on a special phase of a complex problem, there is danger of over-emphasis, of exaggerating the importance of the particular phase under consideration. Perhaps it would be as naïve and as oblivious to a multitude of issues to say that the present war arose in the near East as to say that Great Britain came into the war to defend the principle of Belgium's neutrality. And yet the history of international relations

during the last hundred years shows in almost every decade the decisive influence of the question of the devolution of Mohammedan lands in the foreign policy of the Great Powers. Who can deny that the Eastern question, created by the decadence of Islam and kept in the foreground of diplomatic preoccupations by the fear of each Power that every other Power was trying to "get in on the ground floor" in Mohammedan countries, has been the principal factor in European alliances and European conflicts since the Congress of Vienna?

Napoleon's lack of success in holding Alexander after the Tilsit interview; the impairment of the Holy Alliance over the questions raised by the War of Greek Independence; the policy of England toward France in regard to Mohammed Ali; the Crimean War and the treaty of

Paris; French intervention in Syria; Bismarck's bribe to Russia in 1870; the attitude of England and Austria toward Russia in the Turkish War of 1877 and the Congress of Berlin; Italy's entrance into the Triple Alliance after France took Tunis; the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, with Egypt and Morocco as the principal "compensations"; the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, for which Persia paid the piper; Russia's use of her opportunity in Serbia after Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; the effect of maritime considerations upon Italy's international relations when she found herself in Tripoli and Rhodes; the change in the attitude of the Balkan States toward one another when the Powers imposed the Albanian embargo —had these events no part in preparing and precipitating the Great War? Are

they not exercising a potent influence upon the course of the war? Shall we not have to go back to them, and take them into account, in the reconstruction of Europe? To put Prussian militarism in the place of the devolution of Mohammedan territories as the *summum malum* from which Europe is suffering does not augur well for the world's hope of a durable peace.

I have already written on the problem of Constantinople and its relation to the Eastern question. Italy and the Balkan balance of power will be dealt with later. The bearing of the Islamic problem upon the Eastern question has an importance all of its own. Here we have the aspirations of Mohammedan races, independent and under European control, and the sufferings and hopes of Christian races still in subjection to Mohammedans. The

difficulties that will arise in connection with acting justly and wisely toward these races of the near East when their claims come before the peace conference. and the adoption of a pan-European policy toward the problem of the khalifate, are questions of vital importance in the reconstruction of Europe.

We do not know how many Moslems there are in the world. It is impossible to arrive at even approximate figures. Missionaries and travelers speak "in round numbers," sparing or generous with millions to such an extent that the student, astounded and bewildered by the discrepancies in estimates, becomes skeptical of statistics. In many parts of Asia and Africa the absence of data upon which to compute population (much less the religions professed by the people!) puts estimates of Mohammedan totals into the

field of speculation. But where the population of states or regions has been compiled by government officials who have facts to go upon, and where that population is preponderously Moslem, fairly reliable estimates are possible. Such is the case along the Mediterranean littoral of Africa, in a few African protectorates, in Russian and portions of Asiatic Russia, in India, and in the Dutch East Indies.

A conservative estimate of Moslems under European rule or effective European protection gives:

Great Britain	85,000,000
Holland	30,000,000
Russia	17,000,000
France	15,000,000

There are also Moslems owning allegiance to Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the United States in colonies, and to Austria-Hungary and the Balkan

States directly as citizens; but their number is not large enough to call for a definite Mohammedan colonial policy.

The Mohammedan question, from an international point of view, is not a complicated one for Holland. Her Moslems are on islands and their relations with Mohammedans of independent states and the colonies and protectorates of other European Powers can easily be controlled. Great Britain, Russia, and France, on the other hand, cannot divorce the problem of Islam from their general colonial and foreign policy. Their unique position in the Mohammedan world was one of the compelling forces that gave birth to the Triple Entente. The necessity, perhaps unconsciously divined, of standing together to protect their Mohammedan interests led them to compound colonial rivalries. Thus "the next Euro-

pean war" showed a grouping of Powers very different from that which the observer of European affairs might reasonably have prophesied at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1900, Great Britain was not yet ready to abandon to Germany the title of defender of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and British statesmen were in a frame of mind to look upon France and Russia, rather than upon Germany and Austria, as the disturbers of the world's peace who had to be fought and cured of unhealthy ambitions.[1] The new

[1] This statement needs no confirmation to those who followed the British press between 1898 and 1902. But, as memories are so short these days, I shall give just one quotation. An editorial in the London "Daily Mail," November 9, 1899, said: "The French have succeeded in wholly convincing John Bull that they are his inveterate enemies. England has long hesitated between France and Germany. But she has always respected German character, while she has gradually come to feel scorn for France. Nothing in the nature of an *entente cordiale* can exist between England and her nearest neighbor. France has neither courage nor political sense." Mr. Harmsworth [the present Lord Northcliffe]

orientation of British foreign policy began in 1902, and was determined by the French Agreement of 1904 and the Russian Agreement of 1907.

Most Russian Moslems are Russian subjects. They form compact masses in southern and southeastern Russia, the Caucasus, the Transcaspian district, Central Asia (with Turkestan), and the protectorates of Khiva and Bokhara. Although Russian Moslems are in contact with their *coreligionnaires* in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India, they have no pronounced separatist tendencies, and have not been a source of anxiety to Russia except in the Caucasus and on the Persian frontier. On the other hand, Russia has used her Moslems to make trouble for Great Britain and Turkey. During the first decade of the twentieth century, Tur-

was then, as now, carrying on what he likes to call "a campaign of education" among his fellow-countrymen!

key conducted an agitation against France from Tripoli and Egypt. But the Italian and Senussi wars have shut off French Moslems from Cairo and Constantinople for the last five years. Only upon Great Britain is the necessity imposed, as it has been since the beginning of her imperial policy, of watching Islam in every place where Islam is indigenous. Great Britain cannot afford to be ignorant of any question, of any movement, that affects Islam. East Africa and Zanzibar and Somaliland come into contact with Arabia, West Africa with the Sudan and Tripoli, Tripoli and the Sudan with Egypt. Egypt is adjacent to Arabia and Turkey. The Malay states and Ceylon are in communication with Java and Sumatra and with India. India comes into contact with Central Asia and by Afghanistan with Persia. Aden, the Persian Gulf states,

and Baluchistan are invariably affected by events in Turkey and Arabia and Mesopotamia. Moslem penetration into Central Africa has become a subject of study and reports on the part of Nyassaland and Rhodesian officials. It is not beyond the province of British prudence to watch Islam in Siam, and to wonder how many Moslems there are in China.

The establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco in 1912 left very little of the Moslem world outside of European control or "protection." The five remaining Mohammedan countries, all of them except Afghanistan struggling at the present moment to prevent being subjugated by Europe, have an approximate Mohammedan population as follows:

Ottoman Empire (including Arabia)	14,000,000
Persia	9,000,000
Afghanistan	5,000,000

Tripoli (with Senussi hinterland)	700,000
Albania	500,000

Albania is occupied militarily by Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and Bulgarian armies. The Italians have a foothold at several places on the coast of Tripoli, and had secured European acknowledgment of "annexation" before the Great War broke out. Russians, British, and Turks are fighting in Persia, where the two former have not been able to maintain the cynically established "spheres of influence" of 1907. Turkey is a belligerent, allied to the Central Powers and Bulgaria.

European states have come into conflict with Islam and with one another through commercial and political expansion into Mohammedan countries. The history of international diplomacy in the Islamic world is an unbroken record of bullying and blundering on the part of all the

Powers. In governmental policies one searches in vain for more than an occasional ray of chivalry, uprightness, altruism, for a consistent line of action in attempting to solve the problems that were leading Europe from one war to another, for constructive statesmanship. European cabinets used the aspirations of Christian subject races to promote their own ends against one another, and to threaten Turkey. Then, for fear of sacrificing what they thought they had gained, foreign offices and ambassadors allowed the wretched Christians to be massacred for having dared to respond to European overtures and to put faith in promises of protection held out. European diplomacy inspired Abdul-Hamid to make Panislamism a political propaganda, thus denaturing one of the most promising and beautiful religious revivals of Islam.

When the diplomats saw their mistake, they tried to wrest away the weapon they had put in the sultan's hands, and to use it against one another. In their eagerness to thwart one another and to win concessions and colonies for their own countries, there was alternate bullying and fawning *ad nauseam*. The idea of the "universal khalifate" is wholly foreign to Mohammedan genius and traditions. It emanated from the brains of European statesmen whose knowledge of Mohammedan laws and history was—to say the least—vague.

The indictment of European diplomacy in the near East is terrible: one might even say that it seems incredible. But there are a dozen thoroughly documented treatises on the Eastern question, available in all large libraries, to which the reader of independent judgment who wishes

corroboration of my assertions may go. And do not the facts, as set forth in compact text-books of nineteenth-century European history, speak for themselves? From Vienna, 1815, to Bukharest, 1913, has the concert of European Powers, or any one Power, maintained a consistent, or shown an altruistic, policy, in dealing with the emancipation and devolution of Mohammedan territories? Has there been a traditional grouping of the Powers, some as champions, others as oppressors of small nationalities? What Power has not played the game of encouraging Christians under the Mohammedan yoke, and then abandoned them to their fate, in order not to offend Mohammedan sentiment? The evolution of Serbia, of Rumania, of Bulgaria, of Greece, of Crete; the sufferings of Armenia and Syria; the anarchy of Arabia; the vacillating policy in Egypt

and northern Africa; the intrigues at Constantinople; the handling of Persia and Afghanistan, give us the formula of European diplomacy. It is this: selfish national interest endeavoring to thwart other selfish national interests. Frequently events have proved that the distrust which led to wars and to threats of wars was unfounded. In France and Great Britain public opinion, when enlightened, has sometimes called for a policy dictated by justice and inspired by humanity; but such a policy has not been adopted.

One might remonstrate that it is ungracious and profitless to recall the regrettable past, now that we are in the midst of a war of glorious idealism, when the sins of the ancestors are being dearly paid for in human blood, and when the world is moving irresistibly toward a peace that

will rectify the injustices of nineteenth-century diplomacy. But this is precisely why we need to set forth clearly the issues that are at stake, and to study the means of avoiding the old pitfalls and of securing the triumph of the principles for which millions are giving their lives. Since we hope that this war will bring about a general liquidation of the political ills from which mankind is suffering, the fate of Mohammedan races and of Christian races calling for emancipation from Mohammedan rule must perforce interest us as much as the fate of Belgium and Serbia. Both groups of belligerents, in response to President Wilson's note, while declaring that there is no necessity for American mediation, make an official "bid" for American sympathy and support in establishing a *post-bellum* world status upon the principles of justice and

liberty for all nations, especially for small and weak nations. If we want to get a world vision, then, of a world peace, it is incumbent upon us to acquaint ourselves with extra-European, as well as with European, problems.

The relations of Europe with Islam, the future of the khalifate, the devolution of Mohammedan territories, the status of emancipated Christians—we want to know what the belligerents have in mind as a solution of these questions, which affect vitally the bases of a durable peace. I am able to treat them here only in outline, trusting that the reader will be moved to seek the catalogue of his library or, better still, to consult his librarian. In America the library catalogue is a treasure-house that needs no key, and the librarian is the able and indispensable ally of the schoolmaster and the publicist. Since this

is so, I do not hesitate to attempt to trace in a few paragraphs several factors in the reconstruction of Europe that are unfortunately too little in the public mind.

EUROPE'S ATTITUDES TOWARD ISLAM

A recent manifesto of American educationalists and clergymen, which was quoted widely in the French and British press, condemned the action of Kaiser Wilhelm in trying to arouse Islam against his enemies. The condemnation is just, for Kaiser Wilhelm, as a Christian monarch, is faithless in this action as in many others to the true interests of Christianity and European civilization. But, unfortunately, he has only followed the traditional policy of Christian monarchs, from Francis the First of France to his own grandmother, Queen Victoria. Ever since the Turks set foot in Europe, the

Ottoman sultans have been solicited to give their aid to Christians against Christians, and have been brothers-in-arms of French against Spanish and Germans, French against English and English against French, French and English against Russians, French against Austrians and Austrians against French, Italians against one another, and of each Balkan race in internecine strife. In Asiatic and African expansion, during the last half-century, Germany has been the latest comer in the dangerous and treacherous game of European Powers trying to use Mohammedan fanaticism to menace one another. The most striking examples are Russian intrigue against Great Britain in Afghanistan, and French intrigue against Great Britain in Egypt. Who does not remember, only a decade ago, the agitation of the British press over

Russia's policy in regard to India and the Persian Gulf, and the powerful support the Young Egyptian agitation received in France?

The movement for a Mohammedan renaissance took form during the period between the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars. Its leaders, Al Afghani, Al Kawakebi, Sheik Mohammed Abdu, and Ahmed Khan, were inspired by religious, and not political, ideals. They saw that the decadence of Islam could be checked only by a spiritual awakening, which followed and was nourished by an intellectual awakening. They wanted to revive the old glory of Mohammedan learning, and to create a spirit of solidarity among Moslems such as they believed existed among Christians. Ahmed Khan, in India, laid emphasis upon education, spread not only by schools, but by books

and reviews; Sheik Mohammed Abdu, in Egypt, worked for the casting aside of uncanonical doctrines and traditions and customs with which Islam had become encrusted, and which he declared would prevent the regeneration of Islam; Al Afghani traveled far and wide, preaching Mohammedan unity and solidarity, and founding societies and newspapers to promulgate his ideas; and Al Kawakebi gave his life to denouncing the evils from which Islam was suffering and pointing out the remedies.

It would be idle to speculate upon the influence Panislamism would have had, and the development it would have taken, had it come fifty years earlier. But arising when it did, the movement was a cause of uneasiness and alarm to the European Powers who had been and were still grabbing Mohammedan countries, and also to

Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the beginning of whose reign was marked by the humiliating defeat at the hands of Russia and the imposition of the treaty of Berlin. European diplomacy looked upon Panislamism as a menace to the success of the plans of extension of sovereignty over Moslem countries. Hamidian diplomacy feared that Panislamism, taken up by the Arabs and centered around Mecca, might be used by the European Powers to foment a separatist movement in the distant parts of the Ottoman Empire. There was, then, a common opposition on the part of the Turkish khalif as well as of Christian statesmen to the spread of the Panislamic movement. But the fear of guilty European consciences gave Abdul-Hamid an idea. He put himself, as khalif, at the head of the Panislamic movement, and saw in it the means of

carrying on a political propaganda throughout the whole Mohammedan world. Panislamism was to bring about the revival of the Ottoman Empire in all its ancient glory and power. Abdul-Hamid's agents penetrated everywhere. The sultan began to work on a railway from Damascus to the holy cities of Islam which would transport pilgrims to and from Mecca through Turkey.

Abdul-Hamid would not have succeeded in gaining power and prestige from his Panislamic propaganda had the policy and intentions of European Powers toward Mohammedan states and Mohammedan races been honorable and just. For then they need have feared no dissatisfaction where their control was already established, and need have had no anxiety about the regeneration of Islam in independent states. They would have wel-

comed any movement working for reform and for democracy. They would have seen in Panislamism, if generously aided by them to keep its original spirit, a force that might rehabilitate Islam, and enable Mohammedan races to follow in the path of European races to self-government, independence, and vigorous national life. But that is precisely what the men who guided the foreign and colonial policy of European states did not want, precisely what they have always been willing to precipitate wars to prevent. To prepare Mohammedan colonies and protectorates for self-government, to strengthen and help to rehabilitate weak Asiatic and African states, that would be sheer madness! Not only would commercial and political advantages be lost, but, if the hold already acquired on Mohammedan countries was lessened or released, and if op-

portunities were allowed to pass to get a hold on the remaining independent Mohammedan countries, some other Power would not be so squeamish. No Power—not one—was squeamish. The result is that virtually every Mohammedan country in the world has been treated by European nations as Belgium and Serbia and Poland have been treated. Their wrongs cry out to Heaven to be redressed, their aspirations cry out to the sense of fairness and justice of all mankind to be heard. In a similar position are the Christian races still waiting to be emancipated from the Ottoman yoke. If the wrongs are not known, it is because the world is ignorant of and indifferent to things that happen "far away"; if we are less familiar with the aspirations of Asiatic and African Mohammedan and Christian nations than we are with the aspirations of certain sub-

ject races in Europe, it is because selfish political interest, and not humanitarianism, is to-day the motive power behind championship of small nationalities in every single belligerent country of Europe.

Panislamism was neither fanatical nor political in its inception. It need not have become so in its development. It did not have in it the danger the European statesmen suspected, and as a powerful influence throughout the Mohammedan world that could be wielded as he chose by the Turkish sultan, Panislamism was a chimera, an absurd unreality. The disillusionment of Germany in the present war has proved that European statesmen have long been slaves of a mythical Frankenstein, the creation of their own intrigues and imaginations. Aside from the radical divisions of Sunnites and Sheahs,

there are numerous other sects in Islam. The followers of Mohammed are no more united in religious belief and ecclesiastical affiliation than are the followers of Christ. In fact, the bonds in Islam are so loose, the ideals so democratic, the foundations so lacking in hierarchical tradition and possibilities, that Islam does not enjoy the spirit of unity, does not possess the elements of solidarity.

It is undoubtedly true, on the other hand, that we must guard against interpreting the failure of Islam to march with Turkey in the Holy War as a proof of love and loyalty of Moslems to their European masters, and also against denying the existence of a Panislamic sentiment in regard to Europeans. In densely ignorant and remote and savage countries, which have no national history, the sectators of Mohammed bear no grudge

against the foreigners who rule them. The loyalty and evident good-will of the Sudanese to the British, of which I have written recently, is striking proof of this. Senegalese loyalty to France is another proof. But in Egypt, Arabia, Turkey, Persia, and Albania, *frangi* (the Arabic word includes all Europeans) are anathema. The dislike and distrust of Europeans is general, and no distinction is made by the mass of the people between Europeans of this or that particular Power. They are all *frangi.* The dislike and distrust have come to include native Christians, who lived for centuries in comparative peace under Mohammedan rule. The reason of the xenophobia is the belief that European political and commercial activity, manifested by the presence of foreigners in Mohammedan countries, is actuated solely by the desire to exploit the

natives; and the reason of fanaticism toward indigenous Christian elements is the belief that their fellow Christians are conspiring with European governments to dispossess them. I am not holding a brief for the reasonableness of the Mohammedan attitude. I am simply stating the fact.

It does no good to utter disclaimers, and to argue that the Mohammedans are laboring under a misapprehension. If this war is to solve the question of the Orient, the peace conference must prove to the Mohammedan world by acts, and not by high-sounding phrases, the intention of Europe to put local Mohammedan interests ahead of European interests in Mohammedan countries: by (1) abstaining from partitioning or bringing under direct European sovereignty what countries of the Moslem world have succeeded so far in escaping

the territorial greed of the Great Powers; and (2) taking upon themselves the mutual solemn obligation to prepare for self-government and eventual separate national existence Mohammedan countries now held as colonies or protectorates. For is not the only justfication of "eminent European domain" the happiness and well-being of extra-European peoples in subjection? If so, the complete control (especially in internal affairs) of the European benefactors must be exercised in such a way that the people be prepared for self-government as rapidly as possible: and the people need to be convinced by acts—words no longer count for anything—that the officials imposed upon them place the interests of the occupied country and its inhabitants before the interests of the occupying country. Let no reader exclaim that I am a dreamer, setting forth

an absurd and unrealizable and impracticable policy. It was the American policy in Cuba. It is the American policy in the Philippine Islands.

THE FUTURE OF THE KHALIFATE

The relations of Europe with Africa and Asia have been allowed during the last thirty years to be troubled and upset by a curious and wholly unfounded supposition upon the part of European statesmen that Islam had to have a universal khalifate. As different Powers aspired to be predominant in Constantinople and Arabia, it was believed by each of these Powers that the khalifate could be captured and used for the greater glory of the successful Power and the confusion of the rival Powers! Hence we read constantly in the newspapers and magazines of Europe and America the statement that

the Sultan of Turkey is khalif of the entire Islamic world, a sort of pope, whose religious authority is everywhere acknowledged, and articles are frequently written about "the revival of the Arabian khalifate."

The erroneous conception of the universal khalifate was born of European intrigues and rivalries. Abdul-Hamid was quick to seize upon it, however, and use it as the means of making himself the center of Panislamism. In their eagerness to thwart one another's schemes of expansion and upset one another's already acquired hold in Mohammedan countries, the statesmen of the Powers acknowledged Abdul-Hamid's possession of an office that had disappeared with the immediate successors of Mohammed—an office which the ancestors of Abdul-Hamid, in the heyday of their prestige three centuries before, had

been unable to revive to their profit. Austria-Hungary and Italy were so anxious to get away with their loot that in the treaties of 1908 and 1912 with Turkey, the sultan was recognized as the spiritual suzerain of subjects lost to the Ottoman Empire by the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tripoli grabs. The same blunder was planned for Albania. The action was as foolish as it was meaningless: it created a dangerous precedent. Since Islam is organically theocratic, a Mohammedan ruler cannot be khalif of people who are not under his political jurisdiction. It is possible to conceive of a universal khalifate only if all Mohammedan countries are united in a single Mohammedan empire. That is what Selim I had in mind when, after the conquest of Egypt, he assumed the title of khalif and turned against Persia.

German scholars know all this, but their

kaiser evidently did not. Else he would have been prepared for the failure of a repercussion in the Mohammedan world when his Ottoman ally unfurled the green flag and solemnly declared a *djehad* (holy war) of "the faithful" against the enemies of Germany.

The idea of reviving the Arabian khalifate as a means of hastening the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire has long been gravely discussed. From the British point of view there have been pros and cons; also from the French point of view. The British have opposed the idea when they felt friendly to Turkey and when they feared that an Arabian khalifate might lead to a free Arabia which would endanger their position in Egypt; they have encouraged the idea when they wanted to threaten Turkey and when they hoped that Mesopotamia and the holy

places might fall under their political control. France has viewed the Arabian khalifate in the light of its advantages and disadvantages in furthering her ambitions to acquire Syria and to consolidate her Mohammedan northern African empire. Before the Agreement of 1904, many Frenchmen interested in the near East looked favorably upon the Arabian khalifate as a means of ousting the British from Egypt.

During the present war the agitation for an Arabian khalifate has come to the front again as a war measure against Turkey. The Sherif of Mecca, encouraged by Great Britain and France and now actively aided by contributions of munitions and the sending of native regiments from Mohammedan colonies of the Entente Powers, is in rebellion against the Turks. He calls himself "King of Arabia," and is formally

recognized by France and Great Britain as "King of the Hedjaz." But the poor sherif has not made good his right to the limited title the French and British authorities are willing to let him bear. To the south of Mecca, Said Idris and Immam Yahia, both of whom are "strictly neutral" in this war, are much more powerful Arab rulers than the Sherif of Mecca; and on the north the new "king" (*melek,* by the way, is not a Mohammedan title) is meeting with serious difficulty in conquering the second sacred city of his "kingdom." At this writing Medina is still held by the Turks. As cabinet ministers, the former sherif has appointed three of his sons, and his army is led by the implacable foe of Italy in Tripoli, Aziz Ali Pasha. Before the assumption of sovereignty by the sherif, France sent to Mecca a delegation of distinguished African

Moslems—a tentative step toward recognition of the sherif as "khalif of the Mohammedan world." This mission, which cost the French budget over a million dollars, indicates that French statesmen are persisting in the old error of believing in the universal khalifate—a belief as contrary to the interests of France as it is contrary to reality.

There ought to be no "question of the khalifate" for Europe. It took centuries for Europe to learn the folly of trying to use the Christian religion as a cloak for territorial ambitions and aggression against enemies and rivals, of working to control the head of the church for political ends, of setting up ecclesiastical establishments for reasons of diplomacy. Can we not apply to Asia and Africa the lessons learned? Khalifs and the Mohammedan religion ought to have no connection with

European chancelleries. If European chancelleries believe that the connection should exist, it is because they have in mind schemes of conquest and exploitation of Mohammedan countries.[1]

THE DEVOLUTION OF MOHAMMEDAN COUNTRIES

In discussing this question, it is difficult to go back of the *status quo*—not only difficult, but unprofitable. Once started,

[1] When General Maude brought his army triumphantly into Bagdad, he issued a proclamation assuring the Arabs that the British had not come to subjugate them. I have from reliable authority, also, the fact that in the propaganda among the Messopotamian tribes of Arabia, whose aid to the British made possible in 1917 what could not be accomplished in 1915, emphasis was put upon the "mission of liberty" of the British army. To promise liberty to the Arabs was essential to military success. It is to be hoped that the British at home—the Foreign Office—will realize that liberty to the Arabs is essential also to political success. We have arrived at a point in the world's history when governments must not be dazzled or tempted by immediate advantages.

there is no end to the labyrinth. One wanders in circles, and finds himself in culs-de-sac. In regard to Mohammedan territories already in possession of European Powers, one can ask only for the strict application of twentieth-century principles of treatment of subject races: that the holder prepare the people for self-government, and refrain from exploiting them.

But we have Egypt, whose status has not yet been determined by international agreement; the independent countries, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan; the country Italy is trying to conquer, Tripoli; the country Austria, Italy and the Balkan States are eager to possess, Albania; and the quasi-independent Arabian sultanates and tribes.

From the material point of view, Great Britain has governed Egypt justly, and

there can be no question of the material benefit the Egyptians have gained from the British occupation. The sovereign of the country is content to be under British protection, and, from my personal knowledge, I feel sure that the Egyptians do not want to return to Turkey, or to exchange their British masters for any other actual or formal European protection. From the point of view of the population, then, if the officials of the British Government, following out a policy definitely established by London, rule in such a way as to prepare the Egyptians for internal autonomy, Great Britain is welcome to remain in Egypt. From the European and world point of view British control of Egypt is dependent upon the solution of the question of the world's waterways. Other nations control passages from ocean to ocean: the United States the

Panama Canal, Germany the Kiel Canal, Turkey the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It would be incumbent upon the British to give up the guardianship of the Suez Canal only if the Americans and the Germans and Turks are willing—or are made—to accept the internationalization of the world's waterways. Unless arguments based on principle are applied to all parties alike, can we hope for the "durable peace"? And how else will right transcend force than by the prevalence of arguments based on principle?

The peace conference, seeking an equitable and durable peace, based upon the freedom of small nations, will guarantee the neutrality of Afghanistan and Persia. Such a measure is not only an act demanded by a sense of justice, but also by a sense of political wisdom. The independence and integrity of these two Mo-

hammedan states, an independence and integrity assured by international sanction and not by alliance with or protection of one Power or group of Powers, are as essential for the equilibrium of western Asia as are the independence and integrity of Belgium, similarly assured, for the equilibrium of western Europe. We cannot presuppose a permanent alliance and a permanent common policy between Great Britain and Russia.

The Ottoman Empire is the rock upon which peace conferences have split. 1815, 1856, 1878, marked a new lease of life for the Osmanlis. Each time, during the struggle preceding the conference, the disappearance of the Turks from Europe was confidently predicted. Each time the Turks not only stayed in Europe, but succeeded in keeping under their domination a large portion of their Christian subject

races. But in the approaching peace conference the Turks will not have as powerful friends as formerly, and their crimes have been more widely advertised. It is impossible to conceive of a peace that will leave to the Turks the power to complete the systematic extermination of the Armenian nation by massacre, starvation, and forcible conversion. The Syrian Christians and the Jews of Palestine have also to be considered. As we have seen above, a portion of the Ottoman Arabs, controlling the city of Mecca, have already broken away from Turkish domination. In Austria, Hungary, Russia, and Turkey we have the problem of a dominant race ruling conquered races that have a historic past and that have preserved their separate language, customs, and national consciousness. The setting forth by the Entente Powers of the emancipation of

small nationalities as the principal object of the war affects Russia in Europe and Great Britain outside of Europe as much as it affects Austria and Hungary and more than it affects Germany. When it comes to application of the principle, the Great Powers may find mutually a way of escaping. But there is not apt to be a way out this time for Turkey. The Ottoman Empire will undoubtedly be shorn of its alien elements.

I have set forth the considerations involved in the problem of Constantinople. Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and the Greek Islands are dealt with in the next chapter on the Balkan balance of power. A partition of the Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire among the conquerors in the European War is inconceivable. Turkey is an ally of the Central Powers, and they could hardly despoil her after

several years of comradeship in arms. The Entente Powers, on the other hand, have taken upon themselves before the whole world the solemn obligation to apply in the peace which they would dictate the principle of nationalities in establishing the political status of emancipated territories. Public opinion in the Entente countries must insist, then, upon unswerving loyalty to the ideal in a peace imposed by their arms and their sacrifices.

The Armenians are a nation, with a history of fifteen centuries, a language, a literature, and a church, who have resisted every effort of non-Christian barbarians to uproot them or assimilate them. We want to see them freed, not put under the yoke of Russia to suffer as the Finns, Poles, and Ruthenians are suffering. The Syrians of the Lebanon Mountains are Christians whose separate national

existence is guaranteed by an international treaty, signed by the European Powers. France cannot make Syria a colony without regarding this treaty as a "scrap of paper." And who dares to advocate with honest conscience that the Entente Powers, whose program is the freedom of small nationalities, consent to putting the Greeks of the Ægean Islands and the Asia Minor coast-line in political subjection to their traditional and worst enemies, the Italians?

The problem is a thorny one, and, I am told by my diplomatic friends, "exceedingly difficult." But that is only because European statesmen and politicians have made it so. Let every Power in Europe proclaim its own disinterestedness, and state that it does not regard this war as a war of conquest, but as a war of emancipation, and, lo! the problem disappears. A

Syrian state in Syria, an Armenian state in Armenia or Cilicia, under the collective guarantee of all Europe, and the union of the Greek islands and the middle portion of the Asia Minor littoral to Greece—this is the only program that will satisfy the aspirations of the subject Christian nationalities, and assure a durable peace in the near East. As the Turks (including all Mohammedans who regard themselves as Turks) number nearly ten millions, and are a virile nation, it is foolish to talk of dispossessing them and subjecting them. Desires do not make realities. The Greek and Armenian and Syrian frontiers will have to be drawn moderately.

Beyond Cilicia and Syria there are no Turks, and we can assume, from the lessons of history and from indications manifested everywhere in Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia to-day, that the

Arabic-speaking Mohammedans will make no effort to conserve the tie that has bound them for centuries against their will to the Ottoman Empire. The political future of the Arabic-speaking Mohammedans—the relations of the rival emirs with one another, with the Syrian Christians, and with the Palestine Jews—is too complex a question to be broached here. I can only assert that the difficulties, however, are no more formidable if the principle of "eminent European domain" is waived than if it is maintained. Here, again, there is need of a declaration of territorial disinterestedness all around the table at the peace conference. The Sherif of Mecca, after the proclamation of the kingdom of Arabia, stated this in no uncertain terms. "Al Kibla," the new king's official journal, reports him as saying, when he announced to the Arabic-speaking

world that France and Great Britain were collaborating with him to establish Arabian independence:

If we have expelled the Turks from our territory, it is because we have considered them as foreigners, and they have no part in our historical and religious traditions. How then could we be willing to accept the supremacy of other foreigners? We have prepared our own rebellion against the Turks. No person not of our own race has taken part in it. We have begged the Powers of the Entente not to mix up in our affairs. We have made them well understand that we have determined to preserve Mohammedan independence against all attacks. . . . The Entente Powers are allies whom we respect, and friends whom we love. But, I repeat, our alliance with them is based upon the most complete independence.

All the Mohammedans in the world are of the opinion of the King of Arabia. Islam wants friends, not masters.

ITALY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE BALKANS

One can scarcely count upon a durable peace unless three conditions are fulfilled: (1) existing causes of international troubles should be eliminated or reduced as much as possible; (2) the aggressive objects and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should be discredited in the eyes of their own peoples; (3) above international law, above all the treaties having as object the prevention or hindrance of hostilities, there should be established an international sanction which would stop the most daring aggressors.—*Foreign Secretary Balfour, in a cablegram to the British Ambassador at Washington, January 15, 1917.*

EVERY student of international affairs and the Great War, every thinker who has his mind fixed upon the problem of the durable peace, every lover of humanity, will endorse the three condi-

tions laid down by Mr. Balfour, with one modification. In the second condition, justice as well as common sense leads us to substitute "all the Powers" for "the Central Powers." Only one who is blinded by passion and prejudice, or who feels that some special interest compels him to keep alive the fiction that all the right is on one side and all the wrong on the other, still allows himself the privilege of an "I-am-holier-than-thou" attitude. While the fighting is on, there is such a thing as a *sacred cause*. France and Belgium, who took up arms in defense of their soil, have felt and are still feeling the moral force of being in the right. An appeal to fight for a principle brought to the British Government the support of the Anglo-Saxon race in the colonies and in the United States as well as in the mother country. But there never was a quarrel

that did not have two sides, and no quarrel was ever mended unless the acknowledgments and concessions were mutual.

We must remember that Mr. Balfour was talking about a *world* peace, and was commenting upon the reply of *ten* states to Mr. Wilson's peace overture. He was not speaking for Great Britain alone, nor was he speaking for Great Britain and France. Did he expect to make intelligent men believe that none of the Entente Powers has "aggressive objects" and that none of the Entente Powers is guilty of "unscrupulous methods"? If he could assure us that Japan is prepared to hand over the Shan-tung peninsula to China, that Russia waives her claims to Constantinople and Armenia, that Italy has no territorial ambitions in the Balkan peninsula and Ægean Islands and Asia Minor, that Serbia had not been plotting

against Austria-Hungary for years before the war, that Rumania joined the Entente with no "aggressive object," and that no members of the Entente Coalition had been guilty of "unscrupulous methods" (i.e., massacre and pillage in invaded countries, barbarous treatment of prisoners, ruthless repression of rebellions at home, cruelty on the battle-field, breaking of international law on the high seas), he would be justified in saying "Central Powers" instead of "all the Powers" in setting forth the second condition.

Partizanship is natural. If neutrality of persons does not mean ignorance, it at least means indifference. But partizanship must not be carried over to the *post-bellum* period, else it is as harmful to one's friends as it is to one's foes. We can afford to have neither a pro-Ally nor

a pro-German point of view in writing on the causes of the war and on the reconstruction of the world after the war. If lawyers handled the cases of their clients in the same spirit that most writers are handling the cause of their country or of the group of belligerents to which they have attached their fortunes, i.e., making the abandonment of cold, sober judgment a test of loyalty, could they put up a good defense in court or arrive at a satisfactory settlement out of court? The fact that the United States may be forced to take an active part in the war through Germany's submarine madness in no way lessens the force of the plea for preserving detachment in forming judgments and in envisaging the problems of the reconstruction era. There must be a remorseless pointing out of past errors, a frank acknowledgment of each nation's part in

the development of the general causes of the European War, a mutual willingness to meet on new ground, before we can hope for the reconstruction of Europe on just and durable bases.

The people of France and Great Britain and of the British colonies believe in the justice of their cause, and have a sincere desire to see a new Europe—a new world, indeed—come out of the present cataclysm of suffering and destruction. Until President Wilson gave Count Bernstorff his passports they were grieved and angry at the passive attitude of the people of the United States. They could not understand American official neutrality in the face of the crimes of which Germany had been guilty. They believed that American lust for gold and desire for ease were blinding us to the moral issues at stake. This was because they saw only one side

of the shield. They were thinking only of their enemies and the guilt of their enemies. They saw peace attainable only through crushing their enemies. They did not realize that Americans knew more about the complexity of interests at stake in the war than they did, because we had continually held before our eyes both sides of the shield.[1] We are as keenly alive

[1] Ever since the beginning of the war, I have been writing in the American press in defense of the cause of the Entente Powers, and have pointed out the wrongs of Belgium, the cruelty of the Germans in invaded regions, and the aspirations of certain subject nationalities. The result has been that I have had communications and a flood of literature from all sorts of "national committees" with headquarters in the United States. There are Irish, Polish, Finnish, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), Lithuanian, Armenian, Arabian, Syrian, Persian, Egyptian, Indian, and Chinese committees, whose charges against Great Britain and Russia and Japan, and whose claims for independence, are in most cases as fully substantiated and as well worth being considered as the claims of nationalities subject to Austria-Hungary. The Iugo-Slavs (whose emancipation the Entente Powers' response to President Wilson specified) seem to fear Italy more than their traditional oppressor. Jewish committees and

as any Frenchman or Englishman or Canadian or Australian or New Zealander to the moral issues of the war: but we do not share their illusions about liberal Russia [1] and disinterested Italy. On the other hand, we know that British and French

the Ruthenian committee have sent me evidence of cruelties committed by the Russians in Courland and Galicia on a larger scale than those of the Germans in Belgium. American editors and writers will bear me out in the statement that we are constantly confronted with these charges and claims from sources that can in no way be suspected of being subsidized by or sympathetic to Germany.

[1] It is too early to assert that the entire foreign policy of Russia is changed by the March revolution at Petrograd. History has taught that democracies are a long time in the making, and that Jacobins have imperialistic tendencies. One of the first public declarations of M. Miliukoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, was to the effect that the new régime had not changed in any way Russia's desire to acquire Constantinople. Whether we have a Russia coming to the Peace Conference without demands of territorial aggrandizement and the desire to extend her government over other races without their consent, depends upon the success of the Socialists and the extreme Radicals in keeping in their hands the new Russia whose birth is due to their efforts and their daring.

statesmen have been making, and are still making, bribes to Russia and Italy that constitute a flagrant denial of the principles for the championship of which they ask our support and sympathy. Has it never occurred to the French and English that we are neither stupid nor credulous: and that we are not blinded by the proclamation of the principle of defense of small nationalities in a document which specifies the application of the principle only in cases where the emancipation of subject races would impair the political unity of enemy powers?

"The aggressive objects and unscrupulous methods of *all the Powers* should be discredited in the eyes of their own people." Amen, Mr. Balfour: and let us begin in the Balkans. Your statement to the American people furnishes an excellent starting-point:

It may be argued, it is true, that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe is neither a logical nor a natural part of this general plan [to establish a durable peace]. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was for generations considered essential by the world's statesmen for the maintenance of European peace. Why, one may say, is the cause of peace now associated with the complete overthrowal of this political tradition? The reply is that circumstances have entirely changed.

Mr. Balfour does not tell us how or why circumstances have changed. The Turks are no more cruel or hopeless of reform to-day than they were in 1878, when the British Government, after trying to hush up in England the story of the Bulgarian massacres, threatened Russia with war in order to keep Russia from getting Constantinople.

Circumstances, from the Turkish and Balkan points of view, have not changed at all. They have changed only from the

point of view of British diplomacy. Here we have the secret of the evil from which the world is suffering. The statesmen of the Great Powers, without the knowledge of their electorates, make diplomatic combinations that plunge their own countries into wars and sacrifice weak nations and races. There is no hesitation, no compunction. When a policy inconsistent with a former policy is adopted, the public is told that "circumstances have entirely changed." The public accepts, and the best blood of the nation goes to death without knowing why. Mr. Balfour refrains from showing how "circumstances have entirely changed." Clever casuist that he is, he could explain only by telling the truth. For reasons that have nothing whatever to do with Constantinople and the Balkans a few men decided that Russia and Great Britain

should come to an "understanding." What Great Britain fought one terrible war for, and was ready to fight another, to prevent, she is to-day fighting to achieve. The men who fell in the Crimea and in Gallipoli, two generations apart, could not both have died in a righteous cause.

In the Congress of Berlin, which attempted to decide the destinies of the Balkan nations, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia were not allowed a voice. The Great Powers showed an utter disregard for the interests and rights of the Balkan nations. From 1878 to 1914 the Balkan diplomacy of the Great Powers followed faithfully the policy that guided Beaconsfield and his fellow-conspirators at Berlin. For what were conceived (often wrongly) to be the interests of the British Empire and of other empires that were being built up or

projected, European statesmen showed invariably a willingness to sacrifice the interests of the Balkan nations, repress their logical national development, and use their national aspirations to pit one against the other. Russia and Austria-Hungary and Italy, having conflicting imperial programs that foreshadowed political control of the Balkans, were most guilty. But Great Britain, Germany, and France had their share of blame also. To curry favor with Constantinople and to gain commercial concessions, as well as to give proof of loyalty to alliances that were forming and strengthening, the three Occidental Powers made a show of defending Turkey while secretly countenancing the aggressive conspiracies of their actual or potential allies. This is no sweeping assertion, nor is it raking up forgotten and abandoned policies. We

need to go back no further than the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. We can limit ourselves to citing events in which the responsibility of statesmen who are still in office was engaged. Any one who looks into the diplomacy of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tripoli grabs, the bullying of M. Venizelos and Greece over the Creton question, and the London Ambassadorial Conference of 1913, cannot fail to be convinced that in so far as the Balkans are concerned the diplomacy of all the European chancelleries is tarred with the same brush.

To show how recent is the conviction of the British foreign office to the belief that "circumstances have entirely changed" in the Balkans and necessitate the expulsion of Turkey from Europe in order to assure peace, let me quote the famous note of October 8, 1912, which the Great Powers

delivered to the Balkan States to intimidate them from taking the step Mr. Balfour now believes essential to the peace of Europe. In diplomatic circles it was currently reported at the time that this *chef-d'œuvre* emanated from Downing Street. At any rate, four years ago Great Britain put her signature to a document which said:

> The Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of leading to a rupture of peace. Supporting themselves on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand, in the interest of the population, the realization of the reforms of the administration of European Turkey, on the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, the Powers will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification in the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey.

The Balkan States, who had waited in vain during thirty-four years of oppression and suffering for the application of Article 23 of the treaty of Berlin, knew that no faith could be put in promises of the Great Powers. They knew, too, that suspicion of bad faith of each Power toward each other Power made the last statement of the note ridiculous and meaningless. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro united for the first time in their history, went ahead, and accomplished the work of emancipation in defiance of the will of the Great Powers. They would probably have divided the territories wrested from Turkey without serious friction had not the Ambassadorial Conference of London and the underhand intrigues of at least four of the six Powers forbidden Serbia the access to the Adriatic that she had won by her arms. Sir Ed-

ward Grey afterward said that his part in this disgraceful and disastrous decision was justified by his desire to avoid a European war. By implication, at least, British writers have since tried to establish the fact that Austria-Hungary was directly responsible for barring Serbia from the sea, and that Germany was the real culprit. Wilhelmstrasse, so we are told, was instigating and backing up Ballplatz. This is true, but it is only half the truth. Italy was equally responsible, and Russia played an ignoble rôle in the affair.

The world has moved too fast during the last three years to waste time and energy in lamenting what might have happened and did n't. But the duty is none the less incumbent upon us to keep in mind the Balkan tragedy of 1913 in order that a repetition of it may be avoided. For none of the participants in the European

interference of that year has abandoned the Great Power attitude toward the Balkans. One can see in Balkan events since the outbreak of the present war no desire on the part of any European foreign office to forsake the deplorable diplomacy that has soaked Europe in blood. Where is the statesman in any belligerent country who dares to come out openly and call a spade a spade?

The facts are painful. At the beginning, Serbia was the only Balkan country involved in the European War. It was the desire of the other Balkan States to remain neutral. All of them, with the exception of Rumania, had suffered heavily in the two preceding wars and needed a long period of peace for recuperation. None had the equipment in heavy artillery, ammunition, and aëroplanes to engage in war against a Great Power.

Serbia resisted with admirable skill and courage the first Austro-Hungarian invasion. Her armies routed the invaders completely. But the victory had been dearly purchased, and precious stores of ammunition expended. Serbia's powerful allies were in honor bound to take steps to protect Serbia against a second invasion. Since Turkey had entered the war, interest also dictated the necessity of reprovisioning in war material, and reinforcing the armies of the country that stood between the Central Powers and their Ottoman ally. But the Entente Powers were thinking of themselves and their own territorial ambitions. They hoped to force Turkey into a separate peace very speedily, and when that moment arrived they planned to have in their possession the portions of Turkey they wanted to keep. Until the critical days

came, no attention was paid to Serbia and Montenegro. Then the Entente Powers, who had some months previously showed their unwillingness to accept Greek advice and aid in the campaign against Turkey or to promise to protect Greece against Bulgarian aggression, suddenly called on Greece to go to the aid of Serbia. At the same time negotiations were carried on with Bulgaria and Rumania. In all the Balkan capitals, including that of their faithful little ally, the ministers of the Entente Powers bullied and blundered and bluffed without being able to offer any tangible reward for Balkan aid. The Balkan States knew full well what rewards France and Great Britain had guaranteed to Russia and Italy. What was left for them? Russia balked at giving Rumania even as much as the Bukowina, let alone Bessarabia and Transylvania. Italy re-

fused to yield one iota of her imperial ambitions which could be realized only at the expense of Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria could not be promised the return of her Macedonia *irredenta,* because the veto of Italy prevented the Entente Powers from promising Serbia compensation on the Adriatic for giving up Macedonia to Bulgaria. Great Britain and France could not assure to Greece effective protection against an invasion of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish armies. It was diplomatic incoherence and military impotence.

The events in the Balkans of the second and third years of the war have saved the Central Powers from a humiliating defeat and Turkey from dismemberment. If public opinion in France and Great Britain persists in believing that the debacle of the Entente cause is due to the

stubbornness of Serbia, the pro-German sentiment of King Constantine and his general staff, the cowardice of the Greeks, the treason of Bulgaria, and the foolhardiness and lack of military virtues of Rumania, the Central Powers will have won definitely the war in the East, no matter what happens on the Western front, and the Berlin-Bagdad dream will be as much of a reality as *Mitteleuropa*. German domination in the Balkans may be a justifiable ambition from the German point of view, but not from the point of view of the Balkan races! No races have ever been happy under German control, and the events of this war have not given the world reason for believing in a change in the selfish and barbarous attitude of Germans toward other nations, especially when those other nations are weaker. We know the German theory of national

expansion. It has been set forth over and over again by the ablest German scientists and historians in relation to the *Drang nach Osten:* the weak in the path of the strong must be exterminated or amalgamated.

Without ignoring or denying the existence of a number of contributing factors, we can get to the very heart of the Balkan problem when we are willing to see and set forth the most important reason of Balkan lukewarmness for the cause of the Entente Powers. While recognizing the Teuton menace, because fully aware of Teuton aspirations, Balkan nations attribute the same conception of national expansion to Russia and Italy. The statesmen of Rumania and Serbia and Montenegro, and the leaders of thought in these three Balkan countries allied to the Entente Powers, think on this point

exactly as do the statesmen and leaders of Bulgaria and Greece. So does M. Venizelos, head of the Greek revolutionary government at Saloniki. Before the conquest of Serbia, M. Pachitch was unable to prevent embarrassing interpellations concerning Italy's intentions in the Nish Skuptchina. In fact, the Premier of Serbia has not had a happy moment since Italy joined the Entente. The statesmen of broad vision in Rumania fought bitterly to the very last hour the irresponsible forces at Bukharest that were bent upon the destruction of their country through following blindly the Transylvanian will-o'-the-wisp. When M. Venizelos, humiliated and discredited, feels that it is time to speak out the truth, he will have a sad story of betrayal to tell. On the platform of the station at Lyons, King Nicholas, coming to France for the exile that may

have no end, declared, "Franz Josef struck me on the head, but Victor Emmanuel has struck me in the heart." The King of Montenegro has no illusions about the part his son-in-law's government played by abstention in the crushing of his kingdom.

Russia's pretensions to Constantinople, and the universal opposition of the Balkan races to Russian ambitions, have been dealt with in an earlier chapter. In exposing to President Wilson their aims in the war and their ideas of the bases of a durable peace, the Entente Powers evaded a definite statement on this important question. They spoke only of driving the Turks from Europe. None denies the justice of assuring Russia's passage to the open sea, but it is difficult to reconcile Russian control of Constantinople with the principle of the rights of small nations

to self-government. Russia is ruled by a cruel, despotic, and irresponsible bureaucracy. Even the Liberal Nationalists in Russia have proved themselves as intolerant of the rights of subject nationalities as have the Young Turks. From the Balkan point of view, Russia at Constantinople and the straits (which would mean also a large portion of Thrace) would bring into the peninsula a powerful country who is hated because she is feared by all the Balkan nations.

Five years ago much was written by Occidental observers on the subject of Italian imperialism. But, when the present war broke out, the criticism of Italy ceased. Berlin hoped to keep Italy neutral. Paris and London wanted to detach Italy from her former allies, and get her to enter the war on the side of the Entente. The result was disastrous for Italy, who

began to feel that destiny was calling upon her to play the decisive rôle in European history. The hope of extending her sovereignty over the Trentino and Triest, and the making of the Adriatic an Italian sea could be realized only by intervening on the side of the Entente. But the price of intervention mounted at Rome each month as the importunity of the Entente increased. Italy wanted her full share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. After the failure of the Dardanelles and Saloniki expeditions, the appetite of Italian imperialism was whetted. One does not know how much Italy has been promised in the event of an Entente-victory, but one does know that the French and English statesmen who promised anything at all to Italy beyond the Trentino, and possibly Triest, did so in wilful disregard of the ideals they had set before

them, and for the triumph of which they had solemnly proclaimed to the world that the sword of justice and liberty was drawn.

The contemporary school of Italian imperialists have lost their heads entirely.[1]

[1] According to Signor Giolitti's journal, the Turin "Stampa," which is one of the most influential newspapers in Italy, this madness has spread to the statesmen who are directing the destinies of *all* the European states. Commenting on Mr. Wilson's address to the American Senate, the "Stampa" said on January 25, 1917: "Mr. Wilson speaks like one who can put himself beyond and above the passions and interests which divide us so cruelly. . . . To-day Europe is losing its best men, is seeing some of its immense wealth destroyed, is depending always more and more on the good-will of neutrals for credit and for the furnishing of the materials necessary for her existence and for the continuation of the war." After admitting that the idea of a "peace without victory," suggested by America, hurts European pride, the "Stampa" sums up significantly: "But this phrase could not have been pronounced if Europe, by its insane diplomacy of these last years, had not furnished to the United States the occasion to speak such language. Mr. Wilson's 'peace without victory' reveals the future which is being prepared for Europe, if, through the efforts of the best men of the opposing belligerent groups, one does not find the spirit of reason

If the statesmen of the Entente Powers had studied closely the literature and the programs of the Dante Alighieri Society and the Dalmatian League, and followed the development of the colonial and irredentist propagandas during the last decade, they would have supported with all their power Signor Giolitti and the non-intervention elements in the spring of 1915. Italy's neutrality was a valuable asset to the Entente. Italy's refusal to march with her Central European allies, and the assurance to France that there was nothing to fear on the Alpine frontier, helped incalculably the Entente cause, and was for Italy herself the course dictated by national interest. But active participation in the war on the side of the En-

and the self-mastery necessary to prevent sacrificing, on the fields of battle, hereafter almost stationary, the political, financial, and economic future of all the nations in the war."

tente has been beneficial neither to the Entente nor to Italy. The statesmen of France, Great Britain, and Russia have come to realize that Italian irredentists and imperialists are without shame or limit in their ambitions and are incapable of constructive political vision. They have had to yield to Italian demands, though, in order to keep the coalition intact. The result has been the sacrifice of the Serbians and the loss of Greek aid. Inside the Austro-Hungarian Empire the increased military handicap from taking on a new enemy has been offset by the strengthening of the loyalty of Iuglo-Slavs to the Hapsburg crown. Italy, who needed all her resources for internal development and for the completion of the conquest of Tripoli, is spending herself in the pursuit of illegitimate aspirations.

The men who are controlling Italian

policy could not subscribe to Mr. Balfour's conditions for a durable peace any more than the men who are controlling the policy of Germany. Italy wants to make the Adriatic an Italian sea, to retain the Greek islands she has occupied since the treaty of Ouchy and get more Greek islands, and to win a generous slice of Turkey by extending her sovereignty over the whole Mediterranean littoral of Asia Minor from the corner of the Ægean Sea to the Bay of Alexandretta. It is a far cry from the natural and just demand of sober-minded patriots for the Italian Tyrol and the rectification of the disadvantageous Austrian frontier to this program of spoliation. The realization of Italian aspirations in the Adriatic would enslave Slovenes, Croatians, Dalmatians, Montenegrans, Albanians, and Greeks, and would deprive central Europe of its

only outlet to the Mediterranean. The realization of Italian aspirations in the Ægean and Asia Minor would enslave Greeks, Turks, and Armenians. Thus would disappear all that the Serbians have been fighting for and suffering for, and the dreams of Pachitch and Venizelos, loyal friends of France and Great Britain, who have risked everything for the Entente cause.

When one talks about the Balkans, just as when one talks about the Poles and Armenians and Irish, the common answer is, "They are a bad lot—hopeless, don't you know—never could govern themselves even if they were let alone—would always be cutting each other's throats." This wide-spread impression is the result of "giving a dog a bad name." No proof of the assertions and charges is possible, because the experiment of letting these na-

tions work out their own salvation has not been tried. How dare we, then, say that it would fail? Exactly the same attitude was taken by the rest of Europe during the decades of the slow process of Italian and German unification. Everything that is being said so glibly about the unfitness of self-government of subject races and divided nationalities was said seventy-five years ago about Italians, to whose unification the chancelleries of the Powers were bitterly opposed. Italy was unified, and peace and prosperity reigned in the Italian peninsula only when the Italians were freed from foreign masters, foreign intrigues, foreign internal interference.

Germany is not going to be put *hors de combat* in the duel by the weapon she herself chose. She cannot be forced into submission or repentance by the armies of her enemies. Germany does not admit

that she is in the wrong, and the Government is supported in all sincerity by intelligent public opinion. Germany is gaining ground rapidly in Balkan public opinion, for nothing succeeds like success. The Entente Powers must remember that Germany is in possession. They have one chance left to turn the tide in the Balkans, and that chance is not by reënforcing General Sarrail's army at Saloniki. The fortune of arms has failed them in the Balkans. Insincere and secret diplomacy has also failed them. But they can still put in specific terms, applied to the Balkans, what they have stated in general terms to be their aims in the war. They can send a joint note to friends and foes, Montenegro, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, the Venizelos Government, and the Albanian tribes, declaring that the Entente Powers are willing to guarantee

the Balkan peninsula to the Balkan peoples, and promising unequivocally that, if they are successful in expelling Turks and Austro-Hungarians and Germans, they do not intend to introduce any other foreign element. They can promise to work jointly for the establishment of a just Balkan balance of power, by waiving their own territorial ambitions to make possible a durable peace and the triumph of the principle for which they are fighting.

We have had a hundred years of "practical" diplomacy in the Balkans. Ever since Greece and Serbia began the struggle to shake off the Ottoman yoke, European statesmen have been "practical." They have viewed Balkan conditions not as men with a conscience knew they ought to be, but as men playing a game thought they were. They are doing

the same to-day. If they deny the possibility of an altruistic attitude in dealing with Balkan affairs, are not the Entente statesmen, who are said to have arrived at a secret agreement on the future of the Balkans (an agreement whose terms are unknown alike to their own people and the people of the Balkans), playing Germany's game? The formula of putting might before right is popularly supposed to be German. And—in the Balkans at least—the might is on Germany's side. It is perfectly plain, then, that the Entente Powers must put right before might in the Balkan diplomacy, and must say to the Balkan nations, we are fighting to protect you from Teutonic overlords for your own sakes, and not in order that we may be your overlords. No other argument will convince the Balkan races that it is to their interest to risk now—and in

the future also—opposing the *Drang nach Osten* by coöperating with the enemies of Germany. Having revealed in the Balkans their inferiority in military strength to Germany, the alternative to defeat for the Entente Powers is renunciation of ambitions and methods similar to those of Germany.

The Balkan peninsula has been called contemptuously by European political writers a cockpit. But cocks do not fight unless they are trained, provided with spurs, and set at one another. Banish the Great Powers, and the cockpit would become a barn-yard, with only an occasional spat. If the natural expansion of each Balkan State along ethnographic and economic lines were allowed to develop freely, causes for antagonisms and conflict could be removed, and there would be a possibility of peaceful national develop-

ment and of federation in treating foreign affairs.

Throughout the period of nearly a hundred years during which the Osmanlis were gradually losing the Balkan peninsula there has never been a time that European diplomacy has not been active in repressing the natural expansion of the emancipated races. Every rebellion against the Ottoman yoke, up to and including (as we have seen above) the 1912 war of liberation, has been viewed with alarm by the European Powers. In the guise of aiding and protecting the Balkan nations, the Powers have interfered to frustrate every effort to win independence and national unity. One cannot insist too strongly on the point that the antagonisms between the Balkan States are not primarily due to conflicting aspirations inherited from ante-Ottoman days. In reviving

fourteenth-century conflicts and historic counterclaims and traditions, Greece and Serbia and Bulgaria and Rumania are victims of thwarted natural expansion. European diplomacy, imposing a veto upon natural expansion, caused history to be denatured by translating ancient dynastic rivalries into modern national aspirations.

The Balkan States, in their natural development, need not have turned against one another. There was no necessity for the Macedonian question. If Greece had been allowed to expand into Epirus and to follow her maritime bent by forming an island empire out of Greek islands, Greece would hardly have come into conflict with Bulgaria in Macedonia. If Serbia had been allowed to expand to the Adriatic through Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia, historic Serbian lands inhabited

by Serbian-speaking races, she would not have been induced alternately by Austria and Russia to make a propaganda against Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia. If the treaty of Berlin had not given Rumanian Bessarabia to Russia and "compensated" Rumania south of the Danube with Bulgarian Dobrudja, there need not have been an Alsace-Lorraine question between Rumania and Bulgaria. These hypotheses are not fanciful, or to be rejected without careful examination, for they represent the intimate conviction of eminent Balkan patriots who have devoted their lives to a struggle against the limitations imposed upon them by the rivalry and jealousy of the Great Powers. Aspirations as noble, as just, as sacred as those of Belgium and France have been disregarded and sacrificed, and are being still disregarded and sacrificed, by Euro-

pean diplomacy in the Balkans. And the blame and shame of European diplomacy is all the greater when we have many indubitable proofs, in studying the negotiations between the Powers and Sublime Porte, that considerations wholly outside of anything affecting the Balkan peninsula and its inhabitants most often inspired the efforts of the Powers to keep the Balkans in slavery to the Turks.

Balkan antagonisms can be healed. Conflicting Balkan aspirations can be reconciled. A just and permanent balance of power can be established in the Balkans. What is needed is not a victorious group of Powers imposing their will upon the Balkan nations, but the sincere application of Mr. Balfour's three conditions for a durable peace. The entry of the United States into the war is extremely important and beneficial in regard to the Balkan set-

tlement. For at the Peace Conference, we shall have no ax to grind, and can make our voice heard insistently to assure an equitable settlement. American public opinion, then, must acquaint itself with the Balkan problem, and have a solution to offer. Our idealism will have no weight unless it is logical, intelligent, and constructive. One can suggest the outstanding lines of a settlement that is based upon the interests of the nations concerned and does not have to consider the ambitions of outside Powers.

1. *Rumania.* Whatever inspired and interested "authorities" may write, there can be no doubt that the *terre irredente* of Rumania, Transylvania, and Bukowina, if a plebiscite were taken, would vote to remain with the Austro-Hungarian Empire: so Rumania should renounce solemnly her aspirations in connection with

these provinces in return for evacuation of her territory by the Central Powers. Russia should restore a portion at least of Bessarabia to Rumania, and Rumania should cede back to Bulgaria the part of the Dobrudja she stole from Bulgaria in 1913. The Danube states, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria should be guaranteed unobstructed passage on the Danube through Rumanian waters even in time of war.

2. *Serbia.* Evacuation and restoration of independence upon the following basis: The Central Powers to agree to reconstitute the kingdom as it existed before the treaty of Bukharest, with the exception of the Pirot district, which should be retained by Bulgaria; to give Serbia northern Macedonia up to the minimum line established in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912; to cede to Serbia, Bosnia, Herze-

govina, and Dalmatia from the Narente River to the Bay of Cattaro; not to oppose any future political union between Serbia and Montenegro; not to oppose a possible future division of Albania between Serbia and Greece. Serbia to agree to restore the Pirot district to Bulgaria; to waive all claims to Macedonia south of the line established as the minimum of her pretensions in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912; to bind herself not to make a propaganda officially, nor to permit the *Narodna Obrana* or any other irredentist organization to make a propaganda among the south Slavs of Croatia and other portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; not to fortify the Bay of Cattaro; not to make an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy or with Austria-Hungary.

3. *Montenegro.* The Central Powers

to restore to Montenegro its territories as they were at the outbreak of the present war, and Austria to cede the lower end of Dalmatia from the Bay of Cattaro to the present Montenegran frontier. In return, Montenegro to assume the same obligations as Serbia concerning the fortifications of the Bay of Cattaro and the formation of offensive and defensive alliances with the two great Adriatic Powers; and to promise to submit to a plebiscite the question of political fusion with Serbia.

4. *Bulgaria.* Evacuation of Rumania against the cession of the Dobrudja district which Bulgaria lost in the treaty of Bukharest, and evacuation of Serbia against cession of the Pirot district and all of Macedonia below the minimum Serbia line of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912. Evacuation of Greek Macedonia

against the cession by Greece of Macedonia east of a line drawn from the Mesta River, where it crosses the present Greco-Bulgarian frontier, south between Serres and Drama to the Gulf of Rendina, thus giving Kavala to Bulgaria; the recognition by Greece of Bulgaria's rights to Macedonia west of the Vardar from the present Greek frontier to the minimum Serbian line of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912; and the cession by Greece of Thasos and Samothrace to Bulgaria.

5. *Greece.* Extension northwest to include Epirus south of a line drawn from the southern end of Lake Ochrida to Khimara (north of Santi Quaranta) on the Ionian Sea. Cession to Bulgaria of the eastern end of Macedonia, as outlined above. All the Greek islands in the Ægean Sea (except Thasos and Samothrace, which are essential for the protection

of the Bulgarian coast, and Tenedos and Imbros, which control the Dardanelles) to be handed over to Greece. This means that Italy evacuate Dodecanese and Great Britain Cyprus. Greece must undertake not to fortify Mudros or any other part of the island of Lemnos.

6. *Albania.* Albania will have to remain temporarily as at present constituted, with the exception of the southern Epirote portion, which ought to be allotted immediately to Greece. Albania presents the most perplexing problem of Balkan readjustment, and will have to be kept, under international or Pan-Balkan control as an autonomous region for a period of trial years. If Albanians are able to fuse into a nation, disinterested international control, from which both Austria-Hungary and Italy must be rigorously excluded, will establish the con-

tentions of Albanian nationalists. If the experiment does not succeed, Albania should eventually be divided between Serbia and Greece.

7. *Constantinople and the Straits.* The reasons against Russian occupation have already been set forth in an earlier chapter. If the Turks are driven out of Europe, this region and the islands of Tenedos and Imbros ought to be internationalized, with the Enos-Midia line as the Bulgarian frontier. But as internationalization presents insurmountable difficulties unless the peace conference establishes a similar régime for the other great international waterways, the Balkan balance of power, as well as the general world equilibrium, is best secured by leaving Constantinople and the straits to the Ottoman Empire, with the stipulation that all fortifications be destroyed, free

passage be assured to merchant vessels of all nations and to war vessels of the countries bordering on the Black Sea.

I realize fully that these suggestions are open to objection on many points, but in their ensemble they represent the application of the principle that nations have a right to decide their own destinies, no nation being subjected to another nation by force. I submit that they are practical suggestions, too, for those who are opposed to German political expansion in the near East. For if the conscience of the world is not alive to the necessity and the justice of leaving the Balkan peninsula to the Balkan races, Germany will keep the hegemony in the Balkans that she has already won.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE FOR THE WORLD

No peace can last or ought to last which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate as if they were property. . . . Henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own. . . . I am proposing that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. . . . I am proposing government by the consent of the

governed. . . These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. . . . They are the principles of mankind, and must prevail.—*President Wilson to the American Senate, January 22, 1917.*

EXCEPT in socialist and extreme liberal and radical circles, whose official newspapers reflect the opinion of minority parties, the message of President Wilson to the American Senate was received with coldness and reserve in all the belligerent countries. There was little difference in the editorial comment of London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Petrograd, and Constantinople. Unfortunately, the diplomacy of the European powers has refused during the present war to cut loose from the traditional foreign policy of the nineteenth century. It is impossible for any of the belligerent powers to agree offhand to follow the path of peace and justice unequivocally

set forth by the President of the United States. Adherence to the principles that President Wilson quite rightly calls American policies would mean the end of European imperialism and the abandonment of the doctrine of European "eminent domain."

Europe has made no effort to combat the logic of President Wilson's conditions of a durable peace. I have searched in vain for an editorial or an article or a speech taking up in detail the points of the Presidential message to the Senate, contesting the facts or the line of argument, and endeavoring to show where and how Mr. Wilson is wrong. The criticisms of the message have either evaded the issues altogether and discussed irrelevant matters, or have been born of blind passion and sentimental hysteria. Nowhere in Europe does one find a disposition to

consider any other peace than that imposed by force for the benefit of the victorious group of belligerents. In every belligerent country, including even Turkey, I know personally men of the highest standing and authority who think exactly as President Wilson thinks; but with the single exception of Signor Giolitti, former premier of Italy, not a statesman who played a part in the diplomacy of the decade preceding the present war has the moral courage to approve President Wilson's conditions for a durable peace.

The American President and the American people have not had a good press in Europe since August, 1914. American neutrality has been persistently misunderstood and bitterly resented. There has been a tendency to consider the people of the United States oblivious to moral issues, bent on money-making, and divided

into unassimilated groups according to their European origin. Much of the misunderstanding of America can be traced to Americans resident abroad, who have not hesitated to speak *ex cathedra* about matters of American social and political life, of which they had limited and imperfect, if any, knowledge. During the last two years I have talked with Americans in London, Berlin, Munich, Vienna, and Paris who told me that they were ashamed of their native country for exactly opposite reasons. According to the place in which they lived, these Americans thought that President Wilson had dishonored the American flag and denied the traditions of American history by not declaring war against Great Britain or Germany. Few of them knew anything about either the underlying causes of the European War or the history and social

and political development of the American commonwealth.

President Wilson's message of January 22, 1917, is the embodiment of American idealism. This idealism is not to be sneered at and ridiculed. When President Wilson sets forth the fundamental conditions of a durable peace, declaring that "these are American principles, American policies," and warns the world that the United States "could stand for no others," his meaning is perfectly plain. The weight and influence of America in the peace conference will be thrown into the balance on every question that is brought up to secure "government by the consent of the governed." The entry of the United States into the war should not mean that American principles and American policies are in any way modified. Long before deliberate provocation made

necessary a break with Germany Americans had passed judgment upon Germany's methods of submarine warfare. Belligerency cannot destroy the persistent idealism of the American vision of world peace. It enhances, on the other hand, the significance of that idealism by testing its sincerity. Active participation in the war should not entail the blindness of Old-World traditional prejudices and Old-World racial passions. We are not entangled in the meshes of Old-World diplomacy. We are not bound by secret agreements, entered into without the knowledge of the nation. We have no world empire to retain and increase.

The United States is European civilization transplanted and developed by Europeans. The process has been different from that of any other American state. Canada remained in the political system

of a European power. Immigrants to Canada either retained their Old-World allegiance or were compelled to transfer their allegiance from one Old-World government to another.[1] In Central and South America the stock for three hundred years was mingled with native blood or remained so distinctively Latin that the later European immigration has not been assimilated. The United States is the only country in the world in which all the European races have succeeded in fusing into a new nation.

When one considers how the American

[1] Canadians are not allowed to forget the British North American Act. After writing the above lines, I read that the Supreme Court had just declared unconstitutional the direct legislation law passed by the Manitoba Legislature. The five judges were unanimous in holding that direct legislation was unconstitutional, since it was contrary to the British North American Act. One of the judges remarked in his written opinion: "The public are not sovereign in this country. In the United States the people are sovereign, but we get our sovereign power from England."

nation has been formed, and is still being formed, he realizes the absurdity of criticisms in connection with our attitude toward the European War, hastily made by publicists who know nothing of American history and American life, and taken up and glibly repeated by the unthinking. The outstanding criticisms are: the United States is not a nation, but a collection of unassimilated European groups; Americans cannot understand the issues at stake in Europe.

Alarmists talk of unassimilated immigrant groups in the United States who are not "genuine Americans" and who cannot feel like "genuine Americans." They believe that large immigration to America other than Anglo-Saxon is a phenomenon of the last generation or two. But this is not borne out by the facts. In proportion to the total number of inhabitants of

the United States, the immigration from continental Europe has always been large. It was large even in colonial days. At no time in our national history has this continental immigration proved difficult or slow of assimilations. Nor has it ever succeeded in forming colonies with political attachment to a European motherland. I have not ceased since the beginning of the war to protest against the unfounded and cruelly unjust German-American scare. From the Revolutionary War down to the present time the United States has never had any reason to question the loyalty of the German-American element. Americans of German stock are just as good Americans as those of any other stock. We may not be able to make Americans of the first generation of our immigrants unless they come to us in childhood, but we never fail to cast the second generation

in the American mold. Our schools and early environment are irresistible influences of assimilation. Even in some of our large cities, where first generation immigrants have tried to transplant the Old World, the second generation proves refractory to what it instinctively feels are exotic institutions.

By the last American census, thirteen million Americans were of foreign birth and nineteen other millions were born of foreign parents. An additional five millions have gone from Europe to America since the census of 1910, and the foreign born already in the United States have been more prolific than the native born. Is it to be presumed that this large portion of our population has not brought to America a keen, intimate, personal knowledge of the ills from which Europe is suffering? Do not our American Poles,

Irish, Germans, Bohemians, and Jews know what political and religious persecution means? Do not our immigrants hold in detestation racial antagonisms and the crushing taxation due to the maintenance and increase of armies and navies? Is it forgotten that the foreign elements of the American electorate, inspired by their own bitter experience in Europe, were solidly opposed to the wave of imperialism that threatened to carry the United States into the maelstrom of international colonial rivalry after the war with Spain? The marvelous growth of America during the last two generations is largely due to the desire of Europeans to get away from compulsory military service, and from the financial, economic, and political handicaps of a continent continually disturbed by international rivalries.[1] Our immigrants were not

[1] The criticism that the American attitude is because

driven to America because of inability to hold their own in Europe, and because they felt that transplantation would bring a change of luck. Since 1848, just as in the two preceding centuries, the Europeans who emigrated to America have been the enterprising elements, clear-headed and full of spirit, who dared to cut loose from the past and venture everything in order to win religious and political freedom and better economic conditions.

of ignorance through distance has as sponsor Premier Lloyd-George, who in a recent Abraham Lincoln's birthday-message to the "New York Times" said: "It has been difficult for a nation separated from Europe by an ocean and without political relations with the European peoples to grasp the true significance of this war," etc. Mr. Lloyd-George is one of the most insular of Englishmen, who knows as little about the United States as he knows about the nations of continental Europe. Not more than ten per cent. of the population of the British Isles has any connection with Europe, and the connection of that ten per cent. is extremely slight. Forty per cent. of the people in the United States have an intimate connection with Europe from the Ural Mountains to the North Sea.

The nineteenth-century immigrants met their colonial predecessors, then, on common ground. They came to have a share in the "government by the consent of the governed" that the older stock had established. If they had not appreciated to the full the advantages of the New-World democracy, they would not have come. They were ripe for assimilation from the moment they landed on our shores. The American immigration of each succeeding generation, far from threatening to destroy our institutions, has strengthened them. Through the immigrants, indeed, Americans of older stock have been constantly reminded of their blessings under the New-World dispensation.

The Monroe Doctrine was established, and has been constantly upheld, by the American people. They were unwilling to have the baneful handicaps because of

which they had left the Old World follow them to the New World. Nearly a century of history has proved the wisdom and the success of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has been able to keep out of entangling alliances, and to protect every other American republic from the inevitably disastrous results of the inheritance of European racial rivalry through the extension of European imperialism.

To-day Europe is looking to her children in America for aid in establishing a world peace. We are willing, we are eager, to give that aid; but how can we offer to Europe any other solution than that which we have tested and proved good in the foundation and development of our own national life, and which we are making the basic principle of our own foreign policy? We cannot be convinced

by the polemicists and partizans of either group of belligerents that the panacea for the world's woes is the destruction of Great Britain's naval supremacy or of German's military supremacy. Nor, despite our horror and detestation of what Jews and Poles and Armenians and Belgians and Serbians are being made to suffer, do we think that the punishment of and a change in the political status of Russia, Turkey, Germany, and Austria-Hungary would prevent the renewal in the very near future of wrongs inflicted upon small and weak nations. With President Wilson we propose "government by the consent of the governed" as a formula for the readjustment of the world.

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